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ABSTRACT
Developing a Behavior Modification Safety Program
In an Industrial Setting
(September, 1978)
M, Consuelo de Santamar la, Professional Psychologist,
Universidad Javeriana
Ed.D., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Ena V. Nuttall
This study tested the effectiveness of a simple, minimal ly intru-
sive feedback-suggestion system on the reduction of safety hazards in an
industrial setting. Eighteen hazardous conditions were assessed over 57
observation sessions, for a duration of 12 weeks, for six production
departments. Baselines of varying lengths permitted replication across
the departments at different times. This multiple-basel ine-across-subjects
experimental design served to control potential confounding variables such
as differential reactivity to observational procedures and passage of time.
Intervention consisted of a "feedback package:" presenting super-
visors with copies of the observation form, accompanied by a note which
congratulated good practices and suggested ways for improving safety
hazards, and occasionally comments from a senior executive. The six
department supervisors were divided into. three conditions, depending on
the replication group; Early Feedback, Middle Feedback and Late Feedback
condition,
The results indicated the effectiveness of this simple cost effi-
cient system. Following intervention, hazard frequencies dropped 60^ on
the average across departments, with a range of 29^ to 83^ decrease.
Vstarting with baseline peak ranges from 20 to 55 hazards in each depart-
ment, a more stable pattern was observed after treatment with the high-
est frequency reading 33. Informal data suggested that the intervention
affected the social ecology of the system in a positive manner. For
instance, supervisors appeared to accept more responsibility for safe
practices, management became actively involved in the safety program,
communication problems among supervisors were solved, and hazard preven-
tion awareness among workers appeared to increase.
The results were discussed in terms of interactions between behav-
ioral intervention and organizational variables. The need to incorporate
an intervention program of this type within the organizational structure
was stressed. The role played by the feedback package was clear. However,
the function of each of its constituent parts must await future research.
It was suggested that more complete independence of subjects be maintained
in future studies. Conducting replications at completely separate sites
would control for any spread of effects caused by communication or compe-
tition between subjects. For future research to obtain a more valid
reflection of change after intervention, a weighted frequency system was
suggested as a means of measuring the dependent variable. Also, it was
suggested that to promote maintenance of intervention, supervisory res-
ponsibilities should include the implementation of safety programs. The
value of incorporating the workers more directly in the safety program
was also discussed,
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF
RELATED LITERATURE
When we read about the large number of people that were killed In
the world wars, or the millions of human beings that have died of famine
In the recent history of particular countries, we cannot but feel over-
whelmed and appalled. We wish history had developed differently and
naively believe "someone" should or could have stopped these events from
happening. However, when we find out that the loss of life from Indus-
trial accidents has totaled many times the total number of people who
have died In wars (Blake, 1943) and that accidents are presently the
fourth cause of deaths for all ages after heart disease, cancer and
strokes (Accident Facts, 1977), we do not react similarly. Although In
this case ^ are part of the "facts" and ^ could still do something to
change them, even If not a social level, at least at an Individual level,
we feel very removed from these facts and think to ourselves: "It won't
happen to me, not at my Job, not In this town, etc."
For some reason or another, accident prevention and safety as such
do not appear as the obvious answer to modify not only the accident death
rate but also the amount of Injuries that disable 5^ of the American pop-
ulation every year. Fortunately the safety pioneers firmly believed
accident and Injury rates could be lowered and their efforts have modified
the figures through the years. Yet they are still as high as mentioned
above and they must be reduced further. It is with this Intention that
2the following research was carried out: to try to find an effective
procedure to further reduce the number of hazards and thus the amount of
accidents, In an area where control of such conditions cannot be fully
exerted by the Individual and where a large number of accidents still
occur: the Industrial area.
Obviously, safety Is not a new field of research. Many theories
and programs have been developed to explain and modify accidents. A
historical review of such concepts and efforts will be presented first to
highlight the relative Importance of safety through the years. In this
review a major emphasis will be placed on industrial programs since It
Is not only the area of Interest here but also where safety has developed
the most. Then behavior modification procedures will be presented as an
alternative for the solution of safety problems. The use of such proce-
dures for dealing with other Industry-related Issues will be offered as a
testimony to its effectiveness In this area.
The goal of this project Is to underline the Importance of safety
and to present a specific procedure^ feedback and suggestions on hazardous
conditions, to modify safety related situations In an Industrial setting,
and experimentally measure Its effectiveness.
Safety
Historical Development
Safety or protection of human lives from death and Injury Is as
old as human beings themselves (Stack & Elbow, 1957). Survival was none
other than the anticipation of dangers to meet them skillfully. However,
3early progress In safeguarding human life was delayed by the conviction
that accidents were Inevitable and predestined. Accidents were seen
for too long as an Inherent and integral part of life, as an unmodiflable
condition of an uncontrolled environment. This deterministic and fatal-
istic view began to change with an increase In the control of the environ-
ment through knowledge. Laws were used to explain events and thus per-
mitted to anticipate them realistically. Nevertheless, the efforts to
prevent certain happenings, specifically accidents, were Initially
Individual efforts only. It was not until the "machine age" that an
organized effort to prevent accidents began to develop (Heinrich, 1941).
This explains perhaps the larger development of "Industrial safety" as
compared to other areas of safety.
With the mechanization of industry, which started in England
during the eighteenth century, revolutionary changes were Introduced in
the work processes. Due to the concomitant disruption of the feudal
relations of production in the countryside and the increasing demand for
labor In the towns’ new factories, a large number of people moved from
rural to urban areas to work under increasingly crowded and hazardous
conditions. As the introduction of machinery advanced throughout and
after the Industrial Revolution, work control was progressively taken
away from the workers; the machine now controlled their work. These
conditions account for the large increase in accident rates which gradu-
ally awakened public consciousness to the need for accident control.
This increase in consciousness, however, did not lead to major prevention
programs or improvement in working conditions for many years. Since
4labor was plentiful, employers saw no reason to change and workers had
no laws to protect them (Stack 4 Elbow, 1957). Production was the main
concern and If workers had an accident there were others ready to replace
them. Employers frequently believed they owed no obligation to the
worker. When they did acknowledge responsibility, they "paid their
debt" by giving the worker a Job as Janitor or employing another member
of the family. Deaths were frequent and accepted as the normal price of
progress (Blake, 1943). Since Jobs were so scarce they were taken even
though the risks Involved were pretty high.
Gradually several laws were passed In the different Industrial
countries to protect the worker. In 1833 the British established govern-
ment factory Inspections. In 1844 they enacted a law to provide fencing
for mill gears and shafts. Meanwhile Massachusetts, the leading Indus-
trial state In the United States, Instituted factory Inspections In 1867,
the first bureau of Labor statistics In 1869, and In 1877 a law requiring
the placement of guards around machines. Compensation laws were Intro-
duced ten years later In Massachusetts and twenty years later In England
and Austria (Heinrich, 1941). However, the financial burden of these
laws was still not strong enough to serve as an Incentive to modify
working conditions and maintain a safe environment (Bird & Germain, 1966).
Not until the state laws Increased the cost of occupational Injuries to a
level which affected the employers were they forced to find methods to
reduce Injuries. In fact, workers' compensation laws made accidents so
expensive they did more to promote Interest In safety than any other
factor (Blake, 1943). The first state to pass such a law was New Jersey
In 1911, and the others followed thereafter. Later on. Insurance rate
5levels were to play an Important role in promoting safety: Their depen-
dence upon number of Injuries made prevention efforts very Important to
reduce costs.
It Is Interesting to see that it was not the concern for human
life which led to the development of a safe environment in the workplace.
Nor was the establishment of legal controls an incentive to ameliorate
working conditions. Only when profits were directly affected by workers'
accidents did the employers modify the working environment and only then
did safety become a major concern. It was not until the first decade of
the twentieth century that management undertook the task of preventing
accidents in a relatively consistent way as profitability and safety
became more closely related ("Accident Prevention Manual," 1968).
The crucial importance of the role of the worker in the develop-
ment of safety however, should not be underestimated. It was the
workers who suffered directly the consequences of the unsafe conditions
and it was their protests with the increase In accident rates that
awakened the public awareness which led to the development of the compen-
sation laws. It was the workers, as the pioneers of organized safety
efforts, who in 1912 formed the National Council for Industrial Safety.
A year later that organization was to become the National Safety Council,
an active and well respected organization today.
The National Safety Council . Initially this organization's prime
focus was to study the prevention of industrial accidents. Later on It
was to include all accidents In general as its concern, regardless of
place and activity (Blake, 1943); but its specific efforts have been
6concentrated mainly on Industry. The organization's objective has been
defined as "the elimination of accidents (...) [since] accidents produce
economic and social loss. Impair individual and group productivity,
cause inefficiency and retard the advancement of standards of living"
C'Accident Prevention Manual," 1968, p. 8).
One of the most important contributions of the National Safety
Council has been the elaboration and update of accident records from 1913
onward and the definition and clarification of accidents, its causes and
remedies. Their records show the importance of prevention by allowing
comparisons of the present accident rates with those existent in 1913, and
by showing the differential improvements according to the type and size
of industry. For example, steel, automobile, cement and public utilities
have a much lower accident rate than mining companies, and large firms
report fewer per capita accidents than small businesses (Blake, 1943).
It was also the National Safety Council which developed "the three E’s
for safety": engineering, education and enforcement. Their efforts were
concentrated on engineering safe machines, on training and educating the
employees, and on involving employers In the enforcement of both. They
developed assistant programs for industry and set safety standards for
every type of industry. In fact the industrial firms that are associated
with the National Safety Council do report a lower percentage of accidents
and injuries than those which are not associated ("Accident Facts," 1977).
However, the National Safety Council does not have the legal power to
enforce its policies and guidelines. This role has been assumed by the
(Occupational Safety and Health Act.
7Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)
. This act was passed
by Congress In 1970. It was to be enforced by the Department of Labor,
in response to the concern about the lack of uniform and comprehensive
provisions for the protection against workplace safety and health
hazards (”AII About OSHA,” 1976). It was brought to congressional atten-
tion that 80 million Americans spend their days on the job; that Job-
related accidents have accounted for more than 14,000 deaths; that two
and a half million workers were disabled; and occupational diseases total-
ed 300,000 by 1970. As a consequence Congress passed this law with the
main Intent of assuring ”so far as possible every working man and woman
In the Nation safe and healthful working conditions to preserve our
human resources" ("All About OSHA," 1976, p. I).
OSHA^s Intent has been translated Into practice In various ways:
Through regular Inspections, the establishment of reporting and record-
keeping procedures to monitor job- related Injuries and Illnesses, the
definition of employer and employee rights and responsibilities, the
development of mandatory job safety and health hazards and many other
ways of encouraging employers and employees to reduce hazards and Improve
safety In the workplace.
OSHA has also established safety standards for all types of
Industries and has developed clear safety principles and practices which
permit one to Identify and classify hazards and potential sources of
harm ("Principles and Practices," 1976). The National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Is who performs research and
develops occupational environmental standards applicable to the problems
8of occupational safety and health. Its recommendations cover environ-
mental and medical standards as well as work practices, protective equip-
ment, etc. Periodic reviews of these standards are also NIOSH's res-
ponsibility (NIOSH, 1975, 1977, 1978). In fact, some of these safety
standards and requirements have had to be modified in certain cases due
to the industry’s reaction, to what they termed "insensitivity, harass-
ment and nitpicking" ("Out go silly," 1978).
Facts and Figures
If one were to consider the number of accidents per year without
considering Its relation to the increase in population, that is, absolute
number of accidents per year, the conclusion would be that all the efforts
mentioned previously to enhance safety have been useless. That is why it
is Important to compare the accident data with the earliest reasonably
acceptable estimate, 1912, keeping as a "measure unit" the number of
accidents and disabling injuries over a fixed number of workers.
An accident as defined by the National Safety Council ("Accident
Prevention Manual," 1968, p. 30) Is "an event or rapidly occurring series
of events arising out of an unsafe act or an unsafe condition and culmin-
ating in an unpremeditated injury, death or property damage." A disabling
injury (Heinrich, 1941) is any injury that prevents workers from perform-
ing their jobs for a full day after the accident. The Accident Frequency
Rate (A.F.R.) Is determined by using the following definition (Keefer, 1943,
p. 30):
number of disabling injuries x 1.000.000
A.F.R.
total number of person-hours worked
9According to the National Safety Council, accident rates per
100,000 population were reduced between 1912 and 1976. This reduc-
tion in the overall rate, during a period when the population more than
doubied, has resulted in 1,850,000 fewer accidental deaths than if the
rate had not been reduced. In industry an estimated 18,000 to 21,000
workers lives were lost in 1912. In 1976, in a work force more than
double in size and producing more than seven times as much, there were
12,500 work deaths. This implies a reduction of 7155, from 21 to 6 per
100,000 in work death rates. In 1943 Keefer reported a total of 14,500
deaths for 1933 and a reduction of 67^ from 1926 to 1941. The figures for
1941 were 19,200 work deaths and 10,600 permanent disabilities.
For 1968 the Figures reported by the National Safety Council were
as follows: 114,000 deaths, half of which occurred in the industrial
setting, and 10.8 million injuries of which 2.2 million occurred at the
workplace. The total cost of these accidents was $22 billion, with $7.4
attributed to industrial accidents. This cost, howeyer, is two to three
times lower than if the 1912 rate had sustained itself.
With respect to the size of the industrial organization there are
some interesting figures. As shown on Table I, the small enterprises
seem to have more accidents than the larger ones. According to the
National Safety Council this is due to the lack of specialized safety
personnel, budget tightness and the amount and variety of problems that
a manager of a small business has to confront. This also means that
probably a smal I business would benefit much more from an intervention
than a large firm. Results sbould also manifest a greater improvement in
less time.
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Table I
Size of Industry and Injury Rate
Number of workers
emp 1 oyed
% of total industrial
employment % of total Injuries
500 or more 86 69
100 - 500 12 27
100 or less 2 4
Finally it is important to compare the rate of industrial accidents
against current overall accident rates, since such accidents no longer
account for half the deaths as in 1968, nor do they account for as large
a percentage of injuries. As can be seen on Table 2, work deaths consti-
tute today only 16.5^ of the total number of accidents, and industrial
disabling injuries 22 %. However, the figures are still very high and it
has been said ("Accident Facts," 1977) that while one makes a 10-minute
safety speech, two persons will be killed, 200 will suffer a disabling
injury, and the cost of these accidents will be one million dollars. On
the average, eleven accidental deaths and 1,200 disabling injuries occur
every hour. Half of these happen in motor vehicle accidents and more than
one third occur at home.
As mentioned previously, the preceding facts have had a differen-
tial impact on the development of safety and apparently the cost of
accidents has been the strongest influence in the development of safety
programs. In any case, a profusion of theories and models have been
developed to promote safety as «m be seen In the following section.
Theories and Models about Accident Causatl on
According to the National Safety Council ("Accident Prevention
Manual," 1968) the function of safety Is to assist line management In
achieving maximum production by limiting the number of disabling accidents
and injuries which occur as a result of some unit in the industrial pro-
cess failing: equipment, materials, methods, safety devices or Individual
behavior. Two main ideas can be extracted from this position. First,
that safety efforts' main objective, as set by the National Safety Council,
is production, and second, that accidents can be due to a series of
factors ranging from environmental to behavioral. The National Safety
Council does not believe one factor excludes another, but rather that
accidents are the consequence of a combination of factors in the man-
machine system. This view of accident causation, though shared by many
today, is not universally accepted, a point to be elaborated on below.
As previously was mentioned, accidents did not become a management
concern until relatively recently. Rather, workers themselves were con-
sidered to be at fault. This situation explains, perhaps, the develop-
ment of what can be classified as personality factor theories
,
which
consider human error as the main cause of industrial accidents (Heinrich,
1941; Hersey, 1936; Kerr, 1957; McMurray, 1930). With the enforcement of
laws to protect the worker from the machines, however, the emphasis of
safety literature shifted towards the environment (Dalziel, 1969; Greene,
1969; Jones, 1971; Paterson, 1969). And finally the synthesis has been
achieved by the systems theories which as mentioned previously, conceptual-
12
Table 2
Accidents by Class and Cost for 1976
Class Deaths Injuries Cost^
A. Motor Vehicle
Public non-work 42,500
Work 4.000^
Home 200°
I .700,000
100 . 000
^
10 . 000 °
Tota I 46.700 1 .810.000 24.7 bi I I ion
B. Work
Non-motor
vehicle 8.500
Motor vehicle 4.000°
2 . 100.000
100.000°
Total 12.500 2.200.000 17.8 bi I 1 ion
C
.
Home
Non-motor
vehicle 23.800
Motor vehicle 200
3.700.000
10.000
Tota I 24.000 3.710.000 6.3 bi I I ion
D. Public^
Tota 1 21 .500
GROSS TOTAL 104.700
Corrections for over-
lapping categories - 4.200
NET TOTAL 100.500
2.700.000 5 billion
10.420.000 53.8 billion
I 10.000
10.310.000 53.8^biIIIon
^Includes wage loss, medical expenses
perty damage, fire loss and indirect
insurance administrative cost, pro-
oss, i.e., time lost by non-injured
13
Table 2 continued
workers.
This number appears in two different categories, but accounts for the
overlappings have been corrected in calculatingTne Net I ota I . ^
^Excludes motor vehicles and work accidents in public places. Includes
recreation, transportation except motor vehicle, public building accidents.
The cost data were not available discriminated per categories. The
total therefore, flight be inflated because of overlappings, but this error
should not exceed 4^.
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Ized accident causation factors as a continuum; In some cases the person
is mainly at fault, in others there is a clear interaction between the
person and the environment, and in still others the environmental condi-
tions account for most of the causes of an accident. A more detailed
review of all these theoretical perspectives follows.
Personality factor theories
For many years accidents were believed to be caused by the "acci-
dent prone" worker since accident reports mentioned that \ 0% of industrial
employees had more than 50% of the accidents (McMurray, 1930; Strasser,
Aaron, Boh & Bales, 1964). Greenwood and Woods (1919) for example, after
collecting accident frequency on 14 groups of 50 to 750 women working in
a British munition factory during World War I, found very few workers
had most of the accidents. This led them to say some workers have inher-
ent characteristics that account for their having more accidents than
others. Newbold (1926) followed up on these findings and observed that
the average number of accidents is Influenced to a large extent by a
small number of workers. Later on Farmer and Chambers (1939) introduced
the term "accident prone" based on their own work using psychological
tests with London bus drivers. They believed accident proneness was an
immutable characteristic.
The concept of accident proneness was wel I accepted during the
I940’s and I950’s (Barry, Crisera & 'Fidel 1 , 1 975) . Accident proneness
was defined as a personality trait, "a constitutional tendency within the
organism to engage in unsafe behavior" (Kerr, 1957, p. 3). Tests were
developed to identify such a trait and the personality characteristics of
15
accident repeaters In the search to control the number of Industrial
accidents (Hale & Hale, 1970). Harris, (1949) for example, developed a
paper and pencil test for this purpose and administered It to a group of
25 accident repeaters and to a control group of accident-free workers.
He found no significant difference In the questionnaire results of the
two groups and concluded that the hypothesis of a personality factor
accounting for high number of accidents was untenable. Crawford (I960)
analyzed the characteristics of 735 electric utility workers who had had
220 personal Injury accidents. He was unable to Identify accident prone
Individuals by the traditional statistical analysis. Other tests designed
to measure accident proneness had very low reliability scores, thereby
Invalidating any conclusions about their results (Hale & Hale, 1970).
This failed to support the notion of accident proneness as a constitution-
al factor. However, the tendency to attribute the cause of accidents to
worker’s Individual characteristics remained popular.
Several psychological factors such as Intelligence, personality,
and attitudes have been assessed to try to establish a relationship be-
tween Individual characteristics and accidents. Intelligence as measured by
IQ tests has not been found to be related to number of accidents (Barry et
al, 1975). Lack of knowledge or skill has been used to explain accident
frequency rate. For Heinrich (1931) human failure was the principal cause
of Industrial accidents. He attributed 85^ of accidents to lack of
workers’ knowledge of how to work safely. According to Heinrich, given the
choice between safe, capable and experienced men to work In unsafe condi-
tions, or unsafe. Incapable and Inexperienced men to work In a safe environ-
ment, a safety officer should choose the first alternative.
16
Research on personality and emotional factors Is mixed (Kerr, 1957;
Smith, 1970). Smiley C1955), for example, emphasized the Importance of
emotional disturbance In accident causation. In his study he found 12%
of accident Involved workers had some type of emotional disturbance,
versus only 8$ of control group. Other authors report similar findings
when comparing test results of accident repeaters versus results of
accident-free workers (Tiffen & McCormick, 1962; Whitlock & Crannell, 1949).
Low physical and emotional vigor caused by Individual problems such as
work-related worries, home difficulties, fatigue, lack of sleep, and
periodic emotional disturbances were adduced by Mersey (1936) as the
principal explanation for accidents. Sterner (1969) found motivational
factors responsible for high accident frequency rate. He argued that In
order to decrease the number of accidents It was crucial to change
people’s motives to behave carelessly. On the other hand, Tydiaska (1952)
found no significant difference between high and low accident groups on
personality tests administered prior to employment.
With respect to attitudes several studies have found significant
correlations between high accident experience and negative attitudes
towards employment (Davids & Mahoney, 1975; Harper & Kalton, 1968; Mertens
de Wllmar, 1967). However Barry et a I (1975) point out that their
"Interpretation is confused by some methodological limitations that have
plagued the work on personality variables In accident causation" (p. 3-6).
In sum, although no experimental data has confirmed the effect of
workers’ personality traits on accident rate. It Is still a popular belief
today that accidents are caused by some constitutional factor. Hostility,
Insecurity, Instability, resentment of authority, and other characteristics
17
are still believed to be the explenatlon for accidents. However, "none
of these Cfactors] have been Isolated to show them related to the Inci-
dence of accidents, nor could corrective measures based on them become
practical in application" ("Safety and the Bottom," 1977, p. 2).
Environmental versus individual models
In search of more practical accident preventive measures, and in
response to legal demands to protect the workers, attention has increas-
ingly been drawn towards the environment, towards the situation in which
the accident occurred instead of to the individual involved. As Paterson
(1969) put it, "safety by emotional appeal is no substitute for the con-
scientious application of methods by which effective analysis, specific
remedies and identifiable improvements become a reality" (p. 18). Ade-
quate design of equipment to guarantee effective ways of working a machine
was seen as the primary factor for instituting safety motivational pro-
grams CNertney, 1975). Guards for machinery as a protective measure
became one critical answer to safety concerns (Greene, 1969; Jones, 1971).
Initially guards were resisted both by management and by workers. This
was probably the result of poor design. In many cases guards tended to
obstruct work, making it longer and consequently more expensive, to con-
clude a j’ob. However standard guards were developed for most machines
and today, are part of the machine itself.
Another protective measure was the installation of two push-start
buttons in those machines which, while in operation, could by accident
catch the workers’ hands ("Accident Prevention Manual," 1968). Specific
18
procedures and detailed rules on how to de-schock electricity (Dalzlel,
1969) and how to control high pressure systems (Paterson, 1969) were
developed and became the main part of safety programs. In summary, good
working instructions and safe and properly operating equipment were sup-
posed to maintain low accident rates.
First-aid programs can be placed within the preventive model of
protective environmental changes. Clark (1971) stressed the fact that
the best first aid is the prevention of injury instead of its treatment.
This, he said, required the development of awareness among the workers
about the potential hazards in the work area and the maintenance of
trained personnel to deal with unexpected accidents, Mort (1969) gave
first-aid guidelines on how to deal with accidental Ingestion of chemi-
cals and what type of equipment to have available for such a purpose.
Rettew (1971) recommended the installation of emergency showers and eye
wash facilities mainly in chemical plants, and developed a sel f—appra i sa
I
questionnaire to Identify eye hazards in an industrial setting.
Many other authors have developed more specific first-aid programs
according to the type of setting, in response both to accident prevention
and to deal with Injuries once they occur.
An integrative outlook: the man-machine system
During the past 10 to 20 years the trend of accident causation
theories has been towards an Integration of both individual and environ-
mental factors. As far back as I960, Laner and Sell said human industrial
accidents had three main causes ranging from a low to high proportion of
19
human influence: (a) plant or material failure in the vicinity of people,
for example, a gas escape; (b) contact between machinery and worker, such
as putting a hand inside a presser; and (c) momentary creation of an
unsafe situation such as tool obstructions, oil spills, etc. Although
these authors still attribute a large percentage of fault to the worker,
they do acknowledge the existence of material or environmental hazards.
The National Safety Council clearly states that the prevention of
accidents and injuries is achieved through control of working environment
an^ people’s actions ("Accident Prevention Manual," 1968). It places
great importance on ergonomics as the "scientific approach" to develop a
safer man-machine system. By designing and constructing safe machinery,
people will work more efficiently and will be less likely to make errors
resulting in accidents. The interaction between the worker and the
machine is thus clearly acknowledged.
As accidents have gradually come to be seen as multicaused systems
approaches to accident prevention have been proposed (Pope, 1969; Sasser,
1970; Smith 1970). Hale and Hale (1970) developed a theoretical model of
accident causation in which they defined an accident as "the failure of a
person to cope with a true situation presented to him/her. The cause of
the failure may lie largely with the person, largely with the situation,
or more usually with both" (p. 118). Wigglesworth (1972) postulated an
injury causation model which says that the conditions necessary for injury
to occur are hazard and error. Error is "a missing or inappropriate
response" (p. 73) and hazard "a potential source of bodily damage. . .[wh ichU
may be classified in terms of the type of energy they deliver or... the
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energy exchange which they interrupt" (p. 73), Both errors and hazards
are seen as part of a chain of events in the man-machine system and not
as a blameworthy act of any one person or situation,
Blumenthal (1970) defined accidents as symptomatic of malfunctions
in the man-technological system. He then explained the malfunctions
within an organizational structure model and defined the different safety
problems according to each organizational level.
Hammer CI972) also acknowledged a combination of factors in his
causation theory of accidents. According to this author, injury and
damage could result from four causes: material failure, human error,
adverse characteristics of a product and unusual environmental conditions.
He emphasized the importance of a systems outlook of safety as the only
way to protect the individual.
Barry (1975) strongly contested the individual outlook of preven-
tion. "When we direct our questions to individuals, we ask the wrong
questions" (p. 53) she said. She believed this human causative outlook
led to the search for human error explanations and usually to training
efforts which did not affect injury rates significantly. Barry considered
that the only effective prevention model was the community-oriented model
which integrated all accident factors.
Although this integrative outlook of safety has meant a step
forward in the understanding of accidents and injuries, it has not
generally led to more active intervention programs. The majority of the
safety literature of the past ten years is either concerned with how to
implement a safety program (Firenze, 1969; Goode, |975); how to develop a
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safety department within an organization (Evans, 1969; Strasser et al.,
1964); or how to develop a safety training program (Pflster, 1975;
Price, 1976). Yet few studies report the actual use of a specific pro-
gram. Eicher (1977) for example, described RSO or Reported Significant
Observation as an information-gathering technique which uses employee
participants to describe situations which they have witnessed. Employees
Identify good and bad practices and safe and unsafe conditions. This
permits the Identification of hazards and their elimination. McLean
(1977) suggested the use of videotape equipment by management and the
services of a safety engineer training specialist as an ideal way to study
safer ways to do a job, investigate accidents and train people how to do a
Job safely. Petersen (1975) emphasized the need to integrate the princi-
ples of human learning, the effective approaches to industrial training,
and the development of adequate attitudes towards learning, in order to
Implement a safety training program. Price (1976) stressed the importance
of close cooperation between safety and training professionals in order
to correct deficiencies in safety training programs.
Both the National Safety Council (’'Accident Prevention Manual,”
1968) and OSHA (’’Principles and Practices," 1976) give very detailed and
specific guidelines for the organization of a safety program, the develop-
ment of a safety committee and the implementation of Its activities.
The National Safety Council stresses the fact that supervisors are the
key persons in any safety program because they are in direct contact with
the workers. It also emphasizes the importance of the interdependency
between safety and efficiency, and production to guarantee the effective-
ness of any safety related Intervention, The need not only to implement
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safety programs but measure their effectiveness foiiowing the guideiines
summarized above seems appropriate at this point.
Empirical validation of safety programs: firgt attempts
As mentioned earlier, the major emphasis of the safety literature
has been concentrated on recommendations for safety programs, rather than
on the actual Implementation of such programs or measure of their effec-
tiveness. However the need to find specific ways to measure safety
efforts has long been recognized (Jacobs, 1970; Tarrantz, 1970). Grimaldi
Cj970) for example, recommended a specific method to measure safety per-
formance that remains to be tested. He did report, though, a study In
which he examined by factor analysis the relationship between nine manage-
ment variables such as cost accounting and five safety variables, which
Included standard frequency and severity of accident rates, for 17 busi-
nesses. He found that In firms where there Is good cost control, there
are good safety programs. He also reported that low building and equip-
ment maintenance costs correlated with high safety standards. Rockwell
and Bhise (1970) proposed two experimental approaches to measure safety
performance and developed them fully In theory. They recognized that
their method was still not a de facto safety performance measurement
technique but could very well lead to one. The main advantage of their
model was the continuous assessment of safety performance without waiting
for accidents to occur.
Although the recognition of the need to measure safety programs'
effectiveness is a step ahead, It has not led to many specific studies.
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Most of the research reported has concentrated on finding correlations
between age and/or experience and number of accidents CVan Zelst. 1970)
or relationships between safety program practices and other work factors
in companies with high versus low accident rates using questionnaire
techniques CCohen, A; Smith & Cohen, H.
,
1975), Even though this type
of research definitely has value, it does not fulfill the need of con-
cretely evaluating a specific safety program or technique. There are,
however, a few such studies. A brief review of empirical research in
this field, other than behavior modification programs follows.
An early attempt to actually measure the effectiveness of safety
devices was Bel bin’s Cl 956) experiment with posters. Bel bin questioned
whether the content of a given poster Influenced recall and/or individual’s
behavior and whether that influence was affected by individual differ-
ences such as age and experience. She showed six road safety propaganda
posters to the experimental group for three minutes and afterwards asked
them to identify photographs in which the hazardous conditions were
present. Only six of 24 photos were related to the posters. The control
group was asked to interpret the same set of photographs as the experi-
mental group, but without having seen the posters previously. No signifi-
cant difference in recall was found according to type of poster presented,
but there was a significant difference between the two groups in identify-
ing hazardous conditions. That is, the experimental subjects did not
remember what the posters said, but they could identify hazardous condi-
tions that were mentioned in the initial posters. No significant change
was found in recall after one day, nor after two weeks. A significant
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difference in recall was found between drivers and non-drivers. Drivers
identified hazards more often than non-drivers. These findings led
Belbin to conclude that propaganda posters were effective if the subjects
had previously learned the necessary behaviors to drive safely, but
were not useful by themselves.
Laner and Sell CI960) measured the effectiveness of posters In an
industrial setting by counting the number of accidents which were refer-
red to in the poster. Their main concern was to determine how posters can
be made effective. Thus posters were dispiayed in large sizes, at
strategic places, and following the guidelines of advertising experts.
Three groups of subjects were used: In one, three types of posters were
placed simultaneously throughout the experimental phase. In another,
the three types of posters were put up consecutively every two weeks, and
in the control group no posters were used. The results demonstrated that
there was a differential influence in accident rate between experimental
and control group and that posters were more effective in four of the six
Jobs. The authors concluded that posters can be made effective and do
alter accident rate. The extent to which they do alter behavior, however,
still remains a difficult question to answer due to the many uncontrolled
yariables involved.
Although posters can become effective, they are by no means the
panacea of safety. As Strasser et al. C1964) point out, posters and pep
talks are not the answer to safety problems, and only the use of techni-
ques established in actual operation are effective. But which are those
techniques and how can one measure their effectiveness? Ellis (1975) did
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a review of the efforts to prorate occupetional safety. He divided the
research in five major areas: (a) the setting and enforcing of govern-
ment safety standards; (b) employee safety training; (c) statistical
feedback given to companies on accident rates; (d) management sponsored
safety programs; and te) use of economic incentives. Although Ellis
found that most of the studies were poorly controlled from a methodologi-
cal standpoint, he did report that the research findings consistently
indicated a significant beneficial effect of the management sponsored
programs. This conclusion confirms Firenze's ( 1969 ). Goode's ( 1975 ) and
Strasser et al’s ( 1964 ) principles of safety program development. It Is
also consistent with the management theories which emphasize worker parti-
cipation and management support as the basic elements for the success of
any organizational program (Drucker, 1965
; McGregor, 1968
; Miles, 1975 ).
Behavior Modification as an Alternative Approach to Safety
Prom the review of the literature presented previously, it appears
that additional evaluative studies of safety programs need to be done.
What a safety behavior is, how hazards are depicted and how a safety
committee should be instituted seems clear. But how safety behaviors can
be measured and modified, what procedures should be used to reduce hazards
and how to measure the effectiveness and outcomes of a safety committee
are all areas that definitely need further investigation. There is a
need for self
-evaluative methodologies, of experimentally demonstrated
effectiveness, to permit safety related behaviors and unsafe conditions
to be modified. Considering the definition of behavior modification or
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applied behavior analysis as "a systematic, performance based, self-
evaluative method of changing behavior" (Su I zer-Azarof f and Mayer, 1977,
p. 6) and its frequently reported effectiveness, Cas will be illustrated
below-) this method seems to be a viable and recommended alternative for
dealing with safety problems.
Behavior modification techniques have been used increasingly in
various settings, with a high degree of success (Brown & Presbie, 1976;
Kazdin, 1975). Behavior programs have been implemented in schools and
clinics CAyllon & Azrin, 1968; Clark, Evans & Hamerlynck, 1972), to help
gutistic and retarded children (Fox & Azrin, 1973; Neisworth & Smith,
1973), to modify children’s classroom behavior, or to change their
behavior in the home (Becker, 1971; Bushel I, 1973; Daniels, 1974; Sulzer-
Azaroff & Mayer, 1977; Walker, 1974; Zifferblatt, 1973). Behavioral tech-
niques have also been used successfully to develop self-control behaviors
both in children and adults (Foster, 1974; Tharp & Wetzel, 1972; Thoresen
& Mahoney, 1974) and to teach many other behaviors which individuals need
to deal adequately with their environment (Barlow, Leitenberg & Agras,
1969; Krasner, 1971; Lazarus & Davison, 1971; Lieberman, King, DeRisi &
McCann, 1975; Ulmann & Krasner, 1965).
In the industrial and business fields the application of behavior
modification procedures is fairly recent. However, a whole new field of
research and practice is evolving as behavior modification is found to
be useful in changing people’s behavior in the work place (Luthans &
Kreitner, 1975). A brief overview of this research follows.
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Behavior modification in industry
Behavior modification has been used successfully for management
purposes in various settings. Behavior modification programs have been
found to operate effectively in the government area (Everett, Hayward and
Meyers, 1974; M, , ler 4 Hi
, ler, 1970; Pomerieau,
,975); In the manag^ent
of hospital settings (Quilitch, 1975) and in the service areas (Kohlen-
berg, Phillips 5 Procter, 1976; Winett 4 NIetzel, 1975). For the purpose
of illustrating the use of behavior modification in the Industrial setting
toweven, only research carried out specifically In the area of Industry
and business will be discussed in detail.
Perhaps positive reinforcement has been the most frequently used
procedure to modify behavior in the work place. Herman, deMontes, Domin-
guez, Montes & Hopkins (1973) increased the punctuality of six chronically
late workers by having their supervisor deliver a daily money bonus for
arriving on time. The contingent payment for punctuality significantly
reduced the rate of tardiness of the treatment group as compared with the
control group. Nord (1970) used a lottery system to reduce absenteeism
and tardiness. Each month of perfect attendance made workers eligible to
enter a lottery for one prize per 25 employees, and 6 months perfect
attendance made them eligible for a color television set. The names of
the winners were published in the company newspaper, Sick leave payments
were reduced by 65^ and absenteeism and tardiness decreased to 1/4 of prior
level during the first year of the program.
Pedalino and Gamboa (1974) also decreased absenteeism In a sample
of 215 employees. Using a lottery incentive sysfem, absenteeism rate was
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reduced significantly during the treatment phase as compared to a
reversal period. Orpen (1978) also reported the successful use of
bonuses given for attendance on the absenteeism rate of industrial
workers. Lama I and Bonfield (1978) reported comparative success using
self-monitoring procedures to reduce job tardiness and increase percent-
age of time spent working.
Positive reinforcement has also proven to be effective in reducing
work related errors. By using both positive reinforcement and feedback,
Rettig (1975) managed to decrease the number of errors on accounts pay-
able vouchers of accounting employees of an operator of retail restaurants.
The combination of positive reinforcement and feedback was also effec-
tive in improving driver productivity in an Australian organization
(Mitchell, 1976). A weekly feedback system using a delivery information
record was established to show drivers their progress in the different
problem areas. Any improvement received recognition by way of a note of
congratulations and appreciation from top management. Twenty months after
first changes were introduced, there was significant Improvement across
the range of factors observed. A major increase I productivity was also
reported ("ACDC reaches new," 1975) by a manufacturer of electronic equip-
ment. Once baseline level was established, workers were shown how to
measure their own performance and submit daily and weekly reports. Among
the consequences which proved to be most effective were daily data
reports comparing current with previous performance, beating a past record,
and receiving favorable comments and notes of recognition from the company
pres i dent.
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Gup+on and Lebcw t,97,, used Pne.ack's principle to increase the
number of new service contract calls and sales of two telephone sollci-
By reinforcing the low rate behavior, service calls, with a high
rate behavior, renewal calls, they managed to increase the first con-
sider^bly.
Positive reinforcement, administered by direct line superivsor,
was used effectively by Luthans and Kreitner (1975) to improve group
’
quality control in the production line of a medium-sized industrial
plant. The rate of daily defective parts decreased from an average of 18
per day to two during experimental period. Finally, the reinforcement
procedure has been successfully applied to train supervisors (Goldstein &
Sorcher, 1974; Luthans S Kreitner, 1975); to teach interviewing and
application skills (Barbee 5 Keil,l973) and to develop Job finding skills
and procedures CAzrin, Flores 4 Kaplan, 1975; Jones 8, Azrin, 1973).
Other behavioral procedures besides reinforcement have been success-
fully applied to deal with business-related problems. For example, Marho-
lin and Gray (1976) reduced the cash shortages of six restaurant cashiers
by using group response cost accompanied by verbal and written instruc-
tions. Each cashier would lose from his or her salary the average of
daily loss if such loss exceeded \% of total sales. Cash shortages de-
creased to the goal level during experimental phase and increased during
the reversal period.
Some of the aforementioned reports may lack the strict methodology
to Justify the conclusion that the results obtained were due only to the
behavioral I y-based interventions. Yet they certainly clearly indicate
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the potential for apply!
controlled experimental
to a large number of the
ng principles previously tested in rigorously
conditions. The most interesting finding common
reported experiences was that feedback or
infomatior, about work performance, regardless of social interaction
between workers and managers, is a particularly effective reinforcer
CSantamaria, 1977).
fn a program developed at Emery Air Freight ("At Emery Air," 1973),
providing workers with information on the outcome of their behavior in
achievement and performance terms, was enough to maintain high levels of
performance. Feedback was such an effective relnforcer that when inter-
rupted, for management reasons, performance decreased more than 50/5 in
the shipping operations and rose again when reintroduced (Feeney, 1972).
Feedback was also effective i n ma i nta i n i ng accuracy of performance in a
group of accounting employees as mentioned above (Rettig, 1975), and in
reducing errors of six hourly workers in a parts department of small
aircrafts ("Errors get Whammy," 1976). After measuring the number of
errors employees made In inventory cards and realizing that the employees
were not aware of these errors because they were corrected by a different
group of employees, a list of daily errors was established. This list
was given to the initial group of employees with written instructions on
how to correct them. In less than one week the number of errors de-
creased from a daily average of 34 to 2; department productivity Increased
by approximately 50/5.
The introduction of an informational feedback system reduced the
truck turnaround time in a textile company from a baseline average of 67
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minutes to 38.2 minutes (Runnion, Johnson & McWhorter, 1978). Three
feedback conditions were used: (a) weekly letter with turnaround times
and goals met and suggestions for meeting new goals; (b) feedback letter
sent to plant manager every two weeks; and (c) four week variable feed-
back. Individual re inforcers were introduced also such as congratula-
tory memos from the plant manager and company president; plaques to
warehousemen, etc. According to the authors, feedback not only improved
and maintained cooperative behaviors, but increased efficiency and
reduced costs.
Emmert (1978) measured the impact of group performance feedback
versus individual performance feedback in an industrial setting. He found
that both types of feedback increased performance of the hourly workers
who participated in the study. Individual feedback proved to be dramati-
cally more effective than group feedback. Emmert also discussed the
difficulty of applied research in industry and the many obstacles which
are beyond researchers’ control, particularly the constant turnover and
changes in shifts which make it difficult and sometimes impossible to use
control groups or reversal designs.
Posting a feedback graph in the spinning department of a textile
operation was enough to decrease the number of high bobbins on each of
four shifts (McCarthy, 1978). Initially an average of 55.9 high bobbins
was found for each department. After posting the graph with the number
for each shift, the first goal of reducing high bobbins to twenty per
shift was reached in two weeks. Later on high bobbins were reduced to
12 per shift and a new goal of 3 was set up. Feedback removal resulted
32
in an increase In high bobbins.
The research Indicates that knowledge of one's performance
improvement and awareness of number of errors often seem to be enough to
maintain the behaviors needed for better resuits. However, the smail
number of studies and the difficulties acknowledged in controlling all
the confounding variables suggest the need for more research regarding
the effectiveness of feedback. This is precisely one of the goals of
the present study: to test the effectiveness of a simple feedback proce-
dure in reducing hazardous conditions.
The preceding illustrative review of the use of behavior modiflca^
tion in industry does testify to its effectiveness in modifying work-
related behaviors in Industrial and business settings. Both feedback and
other forms of positive reinforcement have been successfully used to
increase various desirable behaviors, The use of these procedures for
safety purposes will now be reviewed in detail.
Behavior modification and safety
As mentioned earlier, behavior modification techniques seem parti-
cularly appropriate for modifying safety-related behaviors, improving
hazardous conditions, and measuring the effectiveness of such efforts.
Yet, for any number of reasons, the use of behavior modification in the
areas of safety has lagged behind Its use In other areas of Industry.
Pierce, in May, 1977, failed to locate any report of the use of behavior
analysis for safety purposes. The articles available until then, in fact,
either referred to theoretical considerations of the role of reinforcement
schedules in learning safe and unsafe performance (Altman, 1970) or to
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the relationship between efficiency and injury aycidance as measured in
simulated conditions CMcKelvey, Engen S Peck, 1973).
Later in 1977, however, several programs were reported which seem
to be the first examples of the application of behavioral principles to
safety concerns. Pierce himself reports the use of a multiple baseline
experimental design across settings in an institution for retarded adults
(1978). Although this does not refer directly to the industrial setting,
it is historically important: Pierce clearly followed behavioral princi-
ples in his program and measured the effects of the introduction of
environmental change,
Usian (1977) i ntro<juced a positive reinforcement program for
accident reduction in a major shipbuilding facility with 20,000 workers.
The safety target behavior was the number of injuries that occurred
while performing a job task. The subjects were 12 first line supervisors.
After a detailed task analysis, it was found that protective devices were
not consistently worn even though clearly mandated by company policy.
Also, fewer than 10^ of the supervisors wore safety glasses. Positive
reinforcement training focused on increasing the number of times the
workers who reported to the 12 chosen supervisors wore their safety
devices. It was assumed that if safety device wearing behavior increased,
related injuries would decrease.
Treatment consisted of introducing individual training In reinfor-
cement principles to the 12 experimental subjects. The goal of the initial
training phase was to learn to observe behavior and record It. The super-
visors first attended classroom explanations on the type of behaviors to
observe and record, and were then followed around by a trainer who coached
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their recording of "wearing behavior." The second phase called POMOST
for Positive Motivational Safety Training, lasted 28 hours and ^phasized
the reinforcement of safety device wearing behaviors.
Data were collected through hospital logs. The main "effect" of
treatment was to be the reduction of injuries to hands and eyes of the
workers who reported to the 12 trained supervisors. To measure effects
of wearing of protective devices, after training sessions, random obser-
vations were done of the incidence of wearing gloves and glasses for
each of the eight experimental crews. Similar observations were made of
untreated crews for two weeks. Also, subjective assessment was made of
five environmental factors which supposedly were related to frequency
of injuries. These factors were: noise, I ighting, temperature, house-
keeping, and line control.
According to Usian the relations between all injury frequencies
and training was significant, so he concluded reduction was related to
training program. He reported a "strong relationship" between training
and the incidence of hand and eye injuries. The frequency of wearing
safety devices of experimental crews was far higher than the untreated
crews. According to Usian, this is another confirmation of effectiveness
of the training program. Finally, the number of injuries did not seem to
be related to the five mentioned environmental variables.
Usian added an interesting analysis of the relationship between the
success of a safety program and management’s involvement in it. He
stressed the importance of clear communications between top managers and
line workers, and the need to analyze the actual situation before imple-
menting any specific program. He also emphasized the need to determine
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what is reinforcing for a particular group of workers to make any program
effective. He underlined the flaws of implementing programs on the
assumption that what is reinforcing for a particular group of workers is
also reinforcing to every other worker.
Komaki, Barwick, and Scott (1977) reported the use of a behavioral
approach to improve worker safety in two departments of a food manufac-
turing plant with 162 workers. During initial observation it was found
that very little positive reinforcement was given for safe performance,
and very few aversive consequences followed unsafe behaviors. Thus,
desired safety practices were identified and observational codes for
on-the-job performance were developed.
Initially, observations were made of safe and unsafe on-the-job
practices three to four times a week for 25 weeks, Intervention con-
sisted of presentation and explanation of desired behavior to the workers
and frequent feedback. During a 30-minute training session, the workers
were shown pairs of slides presenting incidents of safe and unsafe per-
formances. Desired procedures were stressed. Thereafter the percentage
of safety performed incidents was graphed and posted in each department,
and supervisors were encouraged to recognize incidents of desired perfor-
mance,
A multiple baseline design across groups was used. After five
weeks (19 observations) intervention was Introduced in one department.
Once intervention had been implemented for 12 weeks in the first depart-
ment and three weeks in the second, a reversal phase was instituted. Dur
i ng this phase only observations were recorded, but no feedback was
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given,
During baseline, employees were performing safely at least 2/3 of
the time, with an average of 70* and 77.6* of safety performance for each
department. After intervention, percentage of safe behavior went up to
95.8* and 99.3* respectively, and during reversal period, down to 70.8*
and 72.3*. These results clearly show the Impact of the behavioral
intervention and confirm once more the effectiveness of such procedures.
Ritschl. Mirman and Hall (1977) reported the use of a multiple baseline
research design to measure the effect of an incentive program and super-
visory training in positive and corrective feedback on the rate of lost
time due to injurious accidents in a chemical plant. The incentive pro-
gram called Protective Poker allowed every employee to draw a poker hand
from a complete deck of cards each month contingent upon the employee's
no lost time record for that month. According to the best 10 poker hands,
ten winners were chosen. The supervisors participated in the incentive
plan If their department’s severity rate was below a predetermined stand-
ard. Supervisory training consisted of two 2-hour sessions on positive
and corrective feedback on workers’ safety performance.
Although the study has not been completed, results of the first
group suggested that the program was having an effect on employees’ Injury
rates. The control group’s rates remained relatively unchanged. The
authors discussed the results In light of the constant turnover in indus-
trial settings which may affect experimental outcome. They also sustained
that their data do not support the assumption that new employees are res-
ponsible for high rates of injuries.
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Sulzer-Azaroff (1978) reported the successful use of a system of
feedback plus recommendations for ameliorating hazardous laboratory con-
ditions at a university Materials Science research institute. Although
this research was not carried out in the industrial setting, its value
for the purpose of this project lies in showing the effectiveness of a
simple, non-Intrusive system to improve safety conditions.
Sulzer-Azaroff used a multiple baseline design across settings
in 31 laboratories. First the type, frequency and location of hazards
was measured over a six week baseline period, and laboratories display-
ing medium or low hazard frequencies were assigned to an early, middle
or late treatment group. Written feedback consisted of inspection forms
and a set of suggestions for remedying the hazards.
The results showed that introduction of feedback was paired with
a marked improvement in safety conditions. The author stressed the
effectiveness of a simple, cost-efficient system for safety purposes.
A replication of such a system in the industrial setting becomes a
cha I I enge.
Rationale for Current Investigation
Four main Ideas can be extracted from the material presented
above, which are the foundation for the present research project.
They are:
1. Industrial accidents are a serious health problem according
to the rate of deaths and injuries in the work setting.
2. More theories than applied programs have developed from the
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concern about safety and there is a major scarcity of reports on
program effectiveness.
3. The use of behavior modification techniques in the industrial
setting has shown promising results. In particular, feedback on per-
formance has been an effective procedure.
4. The use of behavior modification procedures for safety pur-
poses in the industrial setting is a developing area. Although research
is not very extensive, it does suggest the following:
(a) training supervisors in reinforcement principles to increase
safety-related behaviors increases such behaviors (Uslan, 1977);
(b) training plus feedback of safe performance increases such per-
formance considerably (Komaki et al., 1977);
(c) a simple feedback system can reduce hazardous conditions
significantly (Su I zer-Azarof f , 1978).
The goal of this project was to build upon the extant behavioral
research and expand the application of behavior principles for safety
purposes in the industrial setting. Two main questions were answered
with the development of this study:
1. Is it possible to design and implement an effective, simple,
minimally intrusive safety program which is economical of time and money
and thus apt to be supported by management?
2. Is it possible to measure the effectiveness of a safety
program designed to reduce hazards in the work setting?
The present study drew upon the research which had demonstrated
the effectiveness of feedback for safety purposes in the industrial
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setting (Komaki et al., 1977) and In the academic environment (Sulzer-
Azaroff, 1978). However the study placed a main emphasis on the contin-
gency network of the organizational structure and thus incorporated the
safety program to the management level.
The next chapter details the specific procedures used In the
study.
CHAPTER II
METHOD
Subjects
Six production supervisors of the main plant of a small industrial
organization participated in the experiment, A consent form (see
Appendix A) was distributed to them by the Personnel Manager before
observations started.
Table 3 summarizes the subjects’ characteristics. As can be
seen, four women and two men formed the supervisor group. Their ages
ranged from 23 to 60 years. Only the supervisor in department number 4
had sales responsibilities in addition to supervision.
Other than the supervisor for department number 3, all supervisors
participated in the study throughout. A management decision to change
the supervisor for department number 3 occurred in the ninth week of
the experiment, prior to implementing the feedback system in this depart-
ment. The new supervisor was then given pre-treatment explanations,
asked to participate and to sign the consent form. The data for the
supervisor for department number 3 presented in Table 3 are the data for
the new supervisor.
Personne
I
Experimenter
. The experimenter, a woman with a background both in
applied behavior analysis and industrial management, conducted and
coordinated the research project. The experimenter’s participation in
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the different stages will be described in the procedure section.
— observers, ages 21 and 24, were two male, undergraduate
students In psychology with previous technical experience in applied
behavior analysis procedures. One of them, who did the daily criterion
observations, was paid on an hourly basis. The second observer volun-
teered his services as a reliability observer, approximately once weekly.
Managers. The Personnel, the Production and Materials Managers, all men
in their twenties, cooperated actively in the definition of hazards and
the implementation of the feedback system.
The Personnel Manager functioned as the coordinator between the
experimenter and any company official. He participated In the develop-
ment of the safety check list, provided company historical data on types
and seriousness of accidents, wrote announcements to workers, explained
feedback system to each supervisor, distributed copies of feedback forms
and contributed ail information he considered relevant for the success
of the program.
Both Production and Materials Managers developed specific sugges-
tions to modify hazardous conditions and were involved in their implemen-
tation. Either the Production Manager or the Personnel Manager distribu-
ted the feedback form.
The Vice-President, son of the owner of the company, participated
as a reinforcement agent by giving verbal praise to the department super-
visors when the number of hazards in their respective departments had
been considerably reduced.
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Safety committee
. Ten members formed the committee, the six supervisors,
the Personnel Manager, the Set-up supervisor, the Chief Engineer and a
Machine Shop worker. The committee had existed for four years. Its main
role was to conduct unannounced monthly inspections to identify existing
hazardous conditions in each department. After inspection a written memo
notified each department's supervisor of the identified hazards.
After the experimenter met with the committee to explain the goals
of the research project, the committee stopped meeting, assuming without
foundation, that the experimental observations would serve as a substi-
ttite for their role.
The Personnel Manager, the Chief Engineer and the machine shop
worker participated in the definition of hazards and elaboration of the
initial safety checklist. Also, several times, the experimenter asked for
their individual advice regarding how to deal with a particular hazard.
Occasionally the mentioned safety committee members were also responsible
for supervising the implementation of changes.
Sett i ng
The study was conducted in a private industrial organization that
developed and manufactured custom fabricated products. It was located in
a New England town of approximately 3Q,Q00 people. The company had 230
employees, working in three different locations. The study was conducted
in the main factory where management offices were also located. However,
the safety program dealt only with the conditions of the plant and did not
include managers' or clerical offices.
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The plant had a working space of 26,000 square feet (see Figure I)
and was divided into six major production departments, a machine shop,
a dark room, a developing production department and a dining room area.
Each department was assigned a supervisor reporting directly to the
Production Manager; the Production Manager, in turn, reported to the
General Manager (.See Figure 2).
Only the si^ departments that participated directly in the produc-
tion process were included in the safety project. Neither the Machine
Shop nor the dark room were included in the safety program due to varia-
bility in work load and practical problems.
Departmenta l structure and schedu I es . Of the six departments, three
were physically enclosed by brick walls or fence wiring and open walkways
enabled one access from one department to another. The other three were
open areas separated from each other by storage racks. Walkways and
aisles were clearly marked by yellow lines on the floor (See Figure I).
Table 3 illustrates the size, number of machines and main function of
each department.
Each department had its own set of hazards. For instance, due to
their location, some departments had no fire exits to keep clear, nor
flammable materials closet to keep closed or machines to guard. Only in
departments 1 and 3 was there the potential for all the hazards to be
present. Departments 5 and 6 did not use any industrial machinery requir-
ing guards.
All production departments operated from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m.
during the summer, and from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m, during the winter. Depart-
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ments 2, 3 and 4 also had a second shift from 3:30 to II p.m. on certain
occasions where the work load required it. A separate group of workers
was assigned to each shift.
Each week workers were given their departmental assignments. Ap-
proximately eight percent of the workers changed departments each week.
The supervisor assigned work every morning according to the production
plan received from the Production Manager.
Apparatus and Materials
1. Observation Forms: The observational recording sheet consisted
of a list of 18 hazards and a map of each department's layout (See Appen-
dix B ). Since each department had a different floor plan, there was a
separate form for each. It was possible, however, to combine the obser-
vations for departments 4, 5 and 6 on one sheet.
2. Weekly data summary chart: A chart with the list of hazards
and the daily total observed in each department (see Appendix C ) was used
to summarize every week’s data.
3. Feedback/suggestion forms: The feedback form was on company
letterhead. It stated the frequency of hazards recorded on a particular
day compared with previous feedback. Congratulatory or encouraging com-
ments were added when hazards had either decreased or increased respec-
tively. An observation form was attached, indicating the type and loca-
tion of the hazard and suggesting ways of ameliorating those problems
(see Appendix D for example).
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Dependent Variables
Throughout the experiment measures were taken of frequency, type,
and location of hazardous conditions found in each department as defined
by the hazard checklist and map in the observation form.
Using OSHA terminology and hazard classification, a list of 18
hazardous conditions was developed. Hazard definitions follow below.
Each major category was subdivided into its component hazard list
because altering a condition required the participation of various people,
as a function of the type of hazard. it was very Important, for example,
to separate obstructions of working material from obstructions of waste.
In the first case, feedback would go to the supervisor and Production
Manager; in the second case, it would go to the supervisor and Materials
Manager.
Hazard Operational Definitions
.
1. Obstruction of wa I ki ng-^worki ng surfaces by:
A. Working material: Material that is being presently used
by workers to accomplish their on-going task. This may
include raw materials, pieces in progress, finished pro-
ducts or any tool that workers require to perform the Job.
B. Cleaning equipment: A I I the elements used to clean the shop,
such as brooms, brushes, buckets, etc.
C. Waste: Anything that is left over by work, whether it has
been placed on gray dumpsters or is thrown to the floor, or
any boxes, pieces of paper, etc. that are left overs.
D. Skids and pallets: Any skid or pallet that has nothing on
top. If working material is on them, they are considered
working material and recorded as one obstruction per skid
or pallet.
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E. Unused equipment; Equipment or parts of equipment that
IS not presently being used to perform the present job,
sprinkler obstructed: If there is anything
on the floor, in the yellow colored area near the exits or^
sprink er or ladders or reclining in such a way so as to pre-
vent climbing ladder or reaching sprinkler.
Hazardous materials:
A, Flammable liquids not identified or left open; If name ofliquid is not placed in outer part of can or if can is left
open
.
B, Flammable materials closed door open: Door to closet is
completely or slightly open.
C, Rags in improper can: Cleaning rags soaking in flammable
liquids are placed in any container other than the tight
covered special cans for them.
Materials storage:
A. Leaning stack: Materials have been stacked in a way that all
the stack or parts of it stick out and are leaning the
length of a palm or more.
B. Foot obstacles or materials Jetting into aisle or walkway:
Materials in storage marked areas, resting on the floor are
sticking out beyond yellow line more than the length of a
palm.
Machine guarding:
A. Guard removed; Guard has been temporarily removed from
mach i ne,
B, Guard misplaced: Guard has been placed in such a way that it
is possible for the worker to put his hand or fingers in an
area where machine could harm them.
Electrical hazards:
A. Knockout off; Knockout of socket is missing,
B. Socket uncovered; Socket has no cover.
C. Socket damaged: Socket is broken or out of place,
D. Socket overloaded: More than one plug has been plugged in
each socket.
50
E. Other: any other electrical hazard or electrical related
problem such as wires hanging low, split wires, etc.
Observation
Data were recorded five days a week at randomly chosen times dur-
ing the day, for 12 weeks. Observations took place during the first
shift while the plant was in full operation, anytime between 8:30 a.m. and
3;30 p.m. Each observation session lasted from 15 to 20 minutes. Ini-
tial iy, observations were going to be done at one specific time, but due
to changes in the production process, major differences were observed
between mornings and afternoons, so it was deemed important to observe at
different random times in order to obtain a more representative sample of
observations. Also, if supervisors knew the observation time in advance,
they could prepare for the observation, thereby invalidating it. To con-
trol this even further, the starting point of each daily observation was
decided by the toss of a coin.
The observer began by filling the date and his name in the obser-
vation form. The main observer, who functioned completely alone three
of the five times a week, would walk around each department observing
the existence of the different hazards. He would not stop and record
each hazard as he found it. Rather, he would walk down an aisle and at
the end of it, away from the locale, would record the actual hazard. If
he had any doubts, he would go back and clarify them. This procedure
was designed to prevent the workers from noting exactly what was being
recorded
,
Each hazard was first recorded on the map using as a code the
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Roman numeral and letter which Identified it on the list, and a numeral
indicating its frequency of occurrence. For example, lA 3 meant there
were three obstructions of working material. After each observation
session, the observer totaled the frequency of hazards within each cate-
gory in the upper part of the observation form and totaled all hazards
for each department in the lower part of the form.
Since there were only one set of observations each day, hazard-
ous conditions, enduring products of hazardous behaviors were selected.
Since hazardous behaviors occurred so infrequently, it seemed more rea-
sonable to record the physical evidence of the behavior. Also, it was
easier to assess the permanent product for reliability of measurement
CSu I zer-Azarof f & Mayer, 1977). If, for example, a machine guard had
been removed, both observers could easily identify and record it as a
hazard. Whereas the corresponding hazardous behavior of putting a hand
or fingers in dangerous sections of machines might very well be overlook-
ed during an observation session. Yet the possibility of an accident
was still present.
Observer training . The observers were blind as to the nature of the
treatment variable Cwritten feedback and corrective suggestions) and
were not aware of the introduction of the experimental phase.
Since the observers had previous experience in behavior analysis
recording procedures, training consisted of Identification and recording
of each particular hazard, The experinienter first gave the observers
written information on OSHA standards to familiarize them with terminol-
ogy and types of hazards. Then the observers informally walked around
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the plant to become comfortable with the setting.
Each written operational definition was reviewed with observers
and also discussed at the site. Observers were presented with examples
of type and number of hazard classification, and any questions were
answered. For example, if two boxes were obstructing an aisle, one on
top of the other, 1A2 should be recorded because one box could be re-
moved after feedback and that fact should be reflected in the feedback
forms. If a can containing flammable liquid was obstructing an aisle
and was also open, it was to be recorded as both lA 1 and as MIA 1,
To obtain reliability of scoring method, after explaining the
form to both observers and discussing the definitions, the experimenter
walked with them around the plant while in operation scoring cooperative-
ly. The goal was to make sure they all understood what was supposed to be
recorded and how. Four trial observations in which both observers and
experimenter scored independently took place, until an agreement
level was reached. In each of these trial observations, disagreements
were discussed and both the list and the definitions were refined.
Observers were instructed to interact as little as possible with
supervisors or workers, When observers were asked by company personnel
what they were doing, they could show them the data collection sheet or
observation form. Any further questions were referred to the Personnel
Manager or the experimenter,
The observers were also asked to record each observation as if they
had never been there before. This meant observing and counting every
hazard in any area as if in the previous sessron it had not been there.
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This was to prevent overlooking changes in areas where conditions were
almost always identical, and to control "observer drift."
Re I i ab i I i ty
Inter-observer agreement of frequency, type and location of hazard
was assessed during the experiment by having the two trained observers
or one observer and the experimenter record data simultaneously twice a
week. The two observers walked down the aisles, one behind the other,
scoring independently. After recording the hazards for each department,
the two observers would stop and compare their observation forms. With-
out changing the scoring on the forms, they would discuss disagreements
and in some cases, go back to the hazard to clarify its type or category,
frequency and location.
The experimenter would calculate the reliability coefficient for
each department’s observation after the observation session. The formula
used was;
number of agreements X 1 00
number of agreements plus disagreements
The number of agreements was the smallest number of hazards per
category between the two observers. The number of disagreements was the
difference between the larger and the smaller number of hazards per
category. An example is contained below;
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Hazards
I
I A
B
C
D
E
Observer 1
10
5
2
4
Observer 2
8
6
2
3
Agreements
8
5
2
3
Disagreements
2
F^e I { a b i I i ty = 20
20 t 4
20
X 100 = 83^
Design
A single subject, multiple baseline design across subjects (Baer,
Wolf & Risley, 1968) was used to assess the impact of the independent
variable Cfeedback and corrective suggestions) on the frequency and type
of hazards. Essentially this design permits replication of the interven-
tion over different subjects at different times. The advantages of this
type of design over the group comparison approach prompted its selection,
According to Hersen and Barlow (1976) these advantages are:
I, Ethical considerations: The procurement of safety is a primary
objective of any organization for all its members, Permanently with-
holding a treatment that is believed to enhance the safety of the employ-
ees, for the sake of experimental control group requirements, would be con
sidered unethical since we could be exposing the non-treatment group to un
safe conditions that could have been modified.
2, Practical problems: The group comparison requirement of
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assembling a homogeneous sample of employees in terms of age, sex,
experience, etc. would have required modifications in the work distribu-
tion of the organization, which would have been impossible.
3. Averaging of results: Due to the importance of identifying
in what specific departments the number of hazards were very high and
which were low and how each was modified by treatment, results averaging
would have obscured individual departmental outcome.
4. Intersubject variability: Group approaches only deal with
between-subjects variability and sometimes variability is due to differ-
ences among subjects. Since with this design the same subjects were
observed during all treatment phases, this type of variability was under
contro 1
.
Baselines were recorded on the frequency and type of hazards of
all six departments. The effect of the independent variable was then
tested with Group I - Early Feedback Condition (Departments I and 2),
while baseline conditions were continued with the other four departments
(see Figure 3). This sequence was replicated with Group II - Middle
Feedback Condition (Departments 4 and 5) and'Group III - Late Feedback
Condition (Departments 3 and 6). The object of this type of design is to
show that regardless of time, the dependent variable changes substantially
when and only when the independent variable is delivered (Souweine, 1976).
After a baseline period of three weeks, feedback and corrective
suggestions were delivered twice a week to supervisors in Group 1. After
six weeks Group II started receiving the bi-weekly feedback and after
nine weeks Group 111 began receiving treatment conditions. Each phase is
Late
Feedback
Condition
Middie
Feedback
Condition
Early
Feedback
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Figure 3. Experimental Design: Multiple Baseline Across Subjects
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described In detail below.
Several criteria were followed in the assignment of the supervi-
sors to the first feedback condition. On the one hand, the frequency
of hazards per department was considered. Although none of the existing
hazards was extremely dangerous, it did seem important to start with
those departments where frequency of hazards was higher. This meant
choosing among departments I, 2 or 3. On the other hand, one of the
concerns of an across subjects multiple baseline design is that change
in one group may influence change in the others. To control this, the
two departments that were physically close together and were apt to
interact more frequently were chosen for the first feedback condition.
The supervisors were requested not to communicate to the others about
the feedback.
The assignment of the supervisors to Groups II and 111 was done at
random. Initially Supervisor for Department 3 was to belong to Group II,
as a function of his department's ranking with respect to other depart-
ments. However, management was beginning to consider changing this super-
visor, so a random choice seemed appropriate. The size of the departments
and the sex of the supervisor were also controlled by using a random
selection procedure.
Procedures
After a baseline period during which data were collected on the
type and frequency of hazards per department, the supervisors were sub-
mitted to the treatment condition of feedback and corrective suggestions.
A pre-treatment phase was necessary to define hazards, establish record-
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mg system, train supervisors and become famiiiar with setting. A more
detailed description follows.
Pt~6~treatment phase
^tablishinq a site. The son of the owner of the company who was
involved in business with a mutual friend was contacted by the experi-
menter. It was established that the company had a safety program and
was interested in evaluating it. The major goals of the research project
were explained. The experimenter assured the company's owner that the
intervention would in no way interfere with production. The role of the
observers was clarified. It was agreed that any interaction between the
experimenter or observers and company personnel would be through the
Personnel Manager. It was also specified that the experimenter would not
expect to receive any financial compensation from the company. The bene-
fit for the company was to be the establishment of a functional feedback
system to modify hazardous conditions.
Meeting with safety committee
. Once the Personnel Manager distri-
buted a general announcement (see Appendix E ) explaining the future visit
of the experimenter and the observers, a meeting was held with the Safety
Committee. The experimenter explained the general goals of the experi-
ment without mentioning the specific type of treatment. She specified
that the two observers would record the frequency of hazards found in each
department according to the guidelines of the Committee and OSHA standards.
Initial emphasis would be placed on identification of hazards and later on
some specific changes would be suggested, The cooperation of the committee
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members in identifying hazards was encouraged,
Ge^nerating the hazard checklist
. After working hours, a tour of
the plant was given by the General Manager and the Personnel Manager.
Some possible hazardous conditions were pointed out. Then in a meeting
with the Personnel Manager, a summary of accidents and injuries for the
past two years was provided. An analysis of these data showed that cuts
and bruises were the most frequent type of injuries and they usually
occurred to new employees who had been working for an average of 3 to 6
months in the company. No pattern was observed according to the Job or
department. An analysis of the safety committee’s inspections revealed
the most frequently reported hazardous conditions. This was used to
develop a preliminary list of hazards.
As previously mentioned, with the combined cooperation of one of
the most active safety committee members, one of the observers, and the
experimenter each hazard was defined in operational terms, reliable
observation forms were developed and the two observers trained.
The pre-treatment phase lasted about one month, during which
there were two to three visits per week. This period served the purpose
of al lowing workers to adapt to the obtrusiveness of the presence of the
experimenter and observers. Although the employees were accustomed to
the occasional presence of visitors in the plant, seeing the same people
visit and take notes every day was unavoidably intrusive. Also, the
general announcement mentioned previously and the supporting comments of
the Personnel Manager and the supervisors served to reduce reactions to
the presence of experimenter and observers. It is assumed that the length
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of the baseline period served to control this problem.
Base I i ne phase
During this phase, safety inspections took place once a day. five
times a week, except for weeks 4, 5 and II when only four inspections
were conducted.
During baseline the experimenter accompanied the observers at
least twice a week to make sure definitions were adequate and that the
recording system was functioning properly. Contact with subjects was
minimal
.
After reporting to the Personnel Manager, the observers would
start data collection either with Department number 4 (see Figure I) or
Department number I. In the first case. Departments 5 and 6 followed,
and then Departments 3, 2 and I. In the second case, the order was
reversed, ending with Department 4.
After 14 observation sessions (3 weeks) It was decided enough data
had been collected to start the treatment phase. Although the data were
not completely stable. It was difficult to continue the baseline period
any longer since some type of Intervention was expected. Also, It was
believed that If In three weeks the data did not show any consistent
pattern, nor stabilized, they probably were not going to.
During the first week, some workers approached the observers
asking who was going to analyze the data and If it was related to their
productivity. Observers answered by showing them the obseryation form.
The removal of certain hazards followed, specially obstructions of walking-
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working surfaces In departments 2 and 4. By the end of the second week,
the workers stopped asking questions of the observers.
Feedback-suggest ion phase
Before deciding which two departments would be assigned to Group I,
the first treatment group, two meetings were held with the Production
and Personnel Managers. It was determined that suggestions should be
very specific and clear. To give the feedback administrative organiza-
tional support, it was decided that the Production Manager should distri-
bute feedback forms. It was also decided to give feedback twice a week,
a schedule more liable to be continued once experimenting was over and
the permanent feedback system establ ished.
Group I - Early Feedback Condition
. After discussing specific
solutions with the Production Manager, the experimenter wrote up the
feedback-suggestion form. The form was modified by the Personnel Manager
and approved by the Production Manager.
A meeting was held with the supervisors from Departments 1 and 2
separately. The Personnel and Production Managers explained the feedback
system in the presence of the experimenter, First the supervisors were
asked to read the form to make sure it was clear. Then they were told
they would be receiving similar forms twice a week. Questions were
answered. Finally the supervisors were requested to keep the system to
themselves. They were asked not to discuss it with the other supervisors
nor the observers.
Feedback-suggestion forms were almost always given on Tuesdays and
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Fridays with respect to Monday's and Thursday's inspections, respectively.
The high frequency of Waste and Unused Equipment obstructions,
resulted in a meeting with Materials Manager to suggest solutions. It
was decided that he should always receive a copy of the feedback-sugges-
tion form. Also, the set-up person and the Chief Engineer received
copies of the feedback suggestion form when their cooperation was needed
+0 implement the change.
After receiving the feedback, the supervisors mentioned that cer-
tain areas in their departments were not their direct responsibility.
With the authorization of Production Manager, the supervisors were given
the responsibility for the safety of these areas.
The forms which took about seven minutes each to prepare, were
given to the Personnel Manager who made the necessary number of copies,
and the original was giyen to the Production Manager to distribute to the
supervisors. Occasionally, however, the Personnel Manager would distri-
bute it himself.
The treatment conditions in Group I seemed clearly to develop an
awareness of hazardous conditions at the management level. In fact, the
Materials Manager took the initiative of calling a meeting with all the
superyisors at the end of the second treatment week. He emphasized the
need to keep aisles clear from obstructions, This unplanned event delayed
the introduction of treatment to Group II for an additional week. Until
data returned to previous baseline levels, treatment would not be intro-
duced with Group I I
.
Group II - Middle Feedback Condition. After three weeks of treat-
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ment conditions in Group I, feedback-suggestion forms were distributed
to supervisors in Group ii. The same procedures were foi lowed as for
Group I.
When feedback alternatives were discussed, the Production Manager
mentioned to the experimenter that certain hazards could not be changed,
For example, certain obstructions were unavoidable due to the lack of
space. The supervisor could not modify these conditions. Since it was
believed that the supervisors could eventually contribute to the modifi-
cation of hazardous conditions by insisting on change at the management
level, it was decided to continue giving feedback and suggestions on
these type of hazards, acknowledging the difficulty of trying to modify
them.
Group 111 - Late Feedback Condition
. Three weeks after introduc-
ing treatment conditions in Group II, the feedback-suggestion system was
started in Group 111. The same procedures mentioned for Groups 1 and I I
were followed. Extra time had to be spent explaining the on-going pro-
gram to the supervisor in department 3 since he had recently been promo-
ted, was not aware of the program, and had never belonged to the Safety
Comm i ttee
.
Treatment conditions were implemented in Group III for |3 days,
over a period of three weeks.
Fol low-up . Two fol low-up sessions were done after data had been
collected for the three feedback conditions. The first one, three days
after the last experimental data collection session, and the second, two
weeks later.
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A meeting was held with all the safety committee members and the
company vice-president to explain the whole program and to present the
results. The need for continuation of the program was stressed. After
explaining group and individual graphs of the results, questions were
answered, and a tentative program was determined to continue the program.
It was decided that two volunteers from the safety committee should be
trained by experimenters on the recording system. Since observations
were to be done once a week instead of once a month (as had been done
before experimental Intervention) the volunteers were to rotate twice
a month.
The experimenter trained the two initial volunteers following
the same procedures for observer training described previously.
CHAPTER III
RESULTS
The data, collected for a total of 57 sessions over a three-
month period, demonstrated the effectiveness of a simple and minimally
Intrusive feedback system in reducing hazardous conditions in ail six
participating production departments. Summary data for the six depart-
ments during baseline and treatment phases are presented in Table 4.
Figure 4 presents the frequencies of hazards per department throughout
the experiment. The results were similar for all departments in that
the mean frequency of hazards decreased from baseline to treatment condi-
tions. However, decrease in hazard frequency was much more marked in
four of the six departments, as will be described below.
During baseline the mean frequencies of hazards in departments
one and two (Group I) was 30.1 and 28.8. They decreased to 13.2 and 5.7
respectively during treatment phase, while frequency in Groups II and Ml
remained approximately at baseline levels. The range of hazards during
baseline varied from a low of 21 and 15 for departments one and two to
a high of 44 and 45 respectively. In department one a downward trend
was observed during baseline, which continued during treatment. The
hazard frequency range during treatment varied between five and 22 for
this department, and reached baseline levels on three occasions. While
in the first three baseline sessions the average of hazards was 39.3, in
the last three sessions this average fell to 12.6. The initiation of
the feedback-suggestion phase was paired with a rapid decrease in the
number of hazards in department two which remained at a low level
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Figure 4.
Total hazard frequency per department.
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throughout. Frequency of hazards in this department only increased
once to baseline levels, and in this case only to the lowest frequency.
The range varied between 0 and 16 during treatment. The average number
of hazards during the first three baseline sessions was in this case
24.3, and it dropped dramatically to a low of 2.6 in the last three
treatment sessions. Measuring the degree of dispersion of the data
about the mean, and using the average absolute value of the difference
between the mean and each data poi nt creferred to as the "measure of
dispersion henceforth), both departments one and two show a substantial
change. Over the baseline period their measures of dispersion were 5
and 5.5; they dropped to 2.86 and 5.7 respectively during treatment.
In Group II the mean frequency of hazards for departments four
and five, was 13.2 and 14.8 during baseline, and it decreased to 8.4 and
1.8 respectively during feedback-suggestion phase. In both departments,
after Initiation of treatment, hazard frequency decreased rapidly. How-
ever, on the whole, the decrease in hazards was much greater in depart-
ment five than in department four. The average of hazards during the
first three baseline sessions was 9.3 for department four and 29.6 for
department five; in the last three sessions this average was 9 and 1.66
respectively. The range of change in hazard frequency went from a low
of six and four to a high of 20 and 35 for departments four and five
respectively during baseline. During treatment the range of each varied
between four and zero to 13 and 14. The measure of dispersion in both
these departments shows important changes. During baseline the measure
of dispersion was 3.6 and 6.89, and it dropped to 1.84 and 1.57 respec-
tively during the feedback-suggestion phase. During sessions 19 and 3z
69
both new material was delivered and a new large shipment had to be
prepared. An increase in hazard frequency can be observed in Figure 4
in these two sessions. Also after session 19 (labeled X) a management
meeting was held with all supervisors emphasizing the importance of
keeping the company clean. A temporary decrease in frequency of hazards
in all departments followed that meeting. Simultaneously with the
initiation of treatment in Group 11, a talk on the increase of hazards
was given by the Production and Materials Managers, to supervisors in
Group III. A reduction of hazards in Group I 1 I can be observed after
session 29 (labeled Y). During session 48 (labeled Z) a general
inventory was carried out in the whole plant. An increase in hazards
can be observed during this session, especially in departments two,
three and five.
The mean frequency of hazards in departments three and six
(Group 111) decreased from a baseline level of 38.6 and 14 to 12.9 and
9.9 respectively during treatment conditions. The Tange of hazards
varied during baseline from a low of 24 and 8 to a high of 55 and 24
respectively, and during treatment from zero and four to 33 and 20.
Once again, the reduction in hazard frequency was greater in one
department, department three, than in the other. In department six,
after treatment started, hazard frequency rose in the second treatment
session to baseline levels. In department three, hazards decreased con-
siderably when feedback-suggestion phase started and a downward trend
was observed throughout treatment and maintained during follow-up.
Hazard frequency increased slightly during session 48 when general
inventory was being performed, as mentioned previously. During the first
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three baseline sessions the average of hazards was 26 for department
three and nine for department six; in the last three sessions this
average fell to 3.3 and five respectively. The measure of dispersion
in these two departments, contrary to the results shown in the others,
shows an increase in the treatment sessions. In department three it
increased from a baseline level of 5.59 to 9.4 in treatment, and In
department six from 3.72 to 4.43. (This was most probably due to the
fact that the treatment period was substantially shorter for these
departments. Although the mean hazard frequencies dropped during treat-
ment, the duration of the phase probably was not long enough to permit
the data to stabilize.)
The arrows in Figure 4 Indicate the days when feedback was
given. As previously mentioned, feedback referred to the previous obser-
vation session; when data were recorded for the following session, the
supervisors had not necessarily yet received the feedback. (This pro-
bably accounts for some delays in decrease of number of hazards.)
When data were analyzed according to type of hazards, the obstruc-
tion of walking-working surfaces accounted for a great majority of hazards
in every department. Thus the reduction concomittant with treatment was
greater in this category than in the others. Figure 5 illustrates the
frequency of each hazard category in department one, serving as an
example of this change. On the contrary, electrical hazards did not show
a major change, as can be seen in the same figure. Similar results
were observed in the other departments.
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SESSIONS
Figure 5. Hazards per category in department !.
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Interobserver reliability
Interobserver reliability was calculated at least once a week
and sometimes twice a week; a total of 16 reliability checks were per-
formed. The mean percent of agreements between observers across the 12
weeks of data collection for each department was as follows: department
I: 93^; department 2: 98%; department 3: 9256; departments 4, 5, and 6:
90%. Overall observer-experimenter reliability was 9455, with a lowest
level of 83^ and a highest of 100? agreement. Table 5 presents the
variance between observers for each reliability session.
Table 5
Minimum and Maximum Percent Agreement Between Observers
Session Minimum % agreement Maximum % agreement
1 91 100
3 89 98
5 84 98
7 88 99
14 83 89
21 85 100
28 88 100
35 91 100
37 83 100
42 88 100
44 90 100
47 86 100
49 91 99
52 93 100
54 95 100
57 98 100
CHAPTER IV
DISCUSSION
The effectiveness of a simple, minimally intrusive, cost-efficient
feedback system was measured and demonstrated In this study. The introduc-
tion of feedback as to amount, type and location of hazards and the sug-
gestions on how to modify them were clearly effective in reducing hazard
frequency In all departments. These results support previous findings
CKomaki et al., 1977; Su I zer-Azaroff
,
1978) on the efficiency of feedback
for safety purposes, and also the contention in the management literature
(McGregor, 1968; Miles, 1975) that any Intervention must be backed up
with organizational support.
Once again the application of behavior modification principles
proved to be functional in the industrial setting, specifically in the
implementation of a safety program. Frequent feedback, concrete suggestions
about how to modify hazardous conditions and congratulatory and encourag-
ing comments appeared to decrease hazards considerably. The results in a
way speak for themselves. However, it would be a mistake to assume that
the feedback and suggestions alone fully explain the success of the inter-
vention. If the organizational structure and the prevalent culture within
the organization had not been considered, analyzed and used, the results
might have been quite different. In other words, not only was the feed-
back Important but in order to implement the program successfully one must
consider who provided it, who was supporting the program, how was It in-
corporated in the daily routine, its relation with production, and how
compliance with suggestions affected supervisors' status. Furthermore,
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consideration of these organizational conditions is also necessary In
order to understand and explain the differential effects in the six
departments. The behavioral Intervention was general ly identical In all
departments; yet Its impact was different, although in every setting
hazard frequency decreased. One hypothesis that could explain such
differences is that the effects of the organizational variables could
have been decisive in the outcome of the program. A brief comparative
analysis of two departments will illustrate this possible explanation.
Department One
The supervisor in this department followed through the suggestions
for which she had the sole responsibility. This accounts for the major
decrease in hazards in her department. However, whenever suggested
change required that she contact the personnel in other departments she
failed to act upon the suggestion. In fact certain modifications were only
implemented when feedback-suggestion copies were delivered to the other
people involved. This is clearly seen after session 34 at which time
feedback was delivered to chief engineer and Materials Manager who then
proceeded to modify the electrical hazards that had been constantly
present.
Initially when the supervisor in department one received the first
feedback-suggestion form, her immediate reaction was: ’’Oh, these are the
same things we had already been told about." This statement could be
Interpreted to mean that she knew what the hazards were, but she did not
believe they could be changed, or that she could change them, since they
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had not been modified in the past. Also, this supervisor seemed to per-
ceive her main responsibility to be production, with safety secondary
in importance. Apparently in her previous interactions with the Produc-
tion Manager, production alone was reinforced. Since her production
quota was adequate, and she had been considered an effective supervisor
for several years, she probably saw no reason to go out of her way to
imp I efnent clianges towards improving safety.
The question is: What else could have been done at the organiza-
tional level prior to and during the implementation of the program to
increase success? Although it is true that in this department some
hazards, such as obstructions of certain material, could not be avoided,
there is no question that hazards could have been further reduced. Per-
haps more clearly articulated support from the Production Manager would
have made a major difference. Had he emphasized the importance of both
production and safety conditions from the beginning, results might have
been even better. Frequent follow-up meetings, presided over by Produc-
tion Manager and attended by other personnel, involved in the imp lamenta-
tion of change, might also have helped. It seemed that this supervisor •
needed more organizational support to follow through on suggestions, so
feedback itself in this department was comparatively less effective.
Whenever feedback was accompanied by intervention at the organizational
level, results were more effective, as observed, for example, after session
34 .
Department Two
The organizational background and present position within the
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company of the department two supervisor probably combined with treat-
ment to account for the impressive results obtained In this department.
The supervisor had recently been promoted to this position when the
safety program was started. She was eager to do a good job and had not
yet had enough previous experience to fail into a behavior pattern In
which production seemed to be the only important task. Perhaps she saw
cooperation with the safety program as a way to earn management's appro-
val and thus consolidate the stabilize her position. In the process she
appeared to realize the importance of safety. Since hazards decreased
considerably in her department she was frequently reinforced with written
and verbal praise from the company's vice-president. The changes in her
department were so marked that they evoked many favorable comments.
On the other hand the management support that this supervisor
received through the program helped her come in contact with personnel
from other areas who were causing an increase in hazards in her own depart-
ment. She was able to "iron out" the differences and have the hazards
corrected. This seemed clearly an effect of the program. Perhaps the
results in this department exemplify more than anything else a mutual
interaction between behavioral program and organizational conditions.
These two examples Illustrate how the organizational variables may
have influenced the outcome of the behavioral Intervention. Similar
patterns were observed in the other departments. It is also important to
emphasize that an effective intervention with an organization should
include a consideration of the structure of the organization. This is
illustrated by the way in which the program was originally implemented:
The "powerful" people were contacted first, their support was secured and
77
both the formal and informal organizational networks were considered in
the introduction of treatment. The literature on management issues and
implementation of change (Beckhard, 1968) suggest similar considerations.
Several other management considerations need to be stressed. For
one, choosing the supervisors as the subjects was dictated by administra-
tive concerns. If supervisors are responsible for safety, they not only
have to model correct performance but also are apt to see to it that their
personnel follow safety standards. This is consistent with the National
Safety Council principles ("Accident Prevention Manual," 1968). It is
the supervisors (Incontrast to the workers) who have the power to imple-
ment change, especially if interaction at other levels is required. When
a program is instituted via the supervisors, its effects are enhanced.
This should not imply that direct intervention at the workers' level (e.g.
Komaki et al.,'s, 1977) would be ineffective. Rather, it suggests the
greater potential for working through the supervisors.
Any safety program probably should be incorporated within the
existing organizational structure so it has a greater probability of
being implemented and maintained. In this program, safety-related sug-
gestions were given to the supervisor. It was expected that they would
directly act upon suggestions in an effort to make safety one more regu-
lar responsibility assigned to the supervisor instead of becoming an
adjunct program, developed by a separate group. When a separate group of
people is assigned responsibility for safety, supervisory safety respon-
sibilities may be transferred to that group. Since the safety group is
not in a position to monitor as constantly as the supervisors, coverage
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would have to be mors superficial. Unfortunately, due to a number of
factors including time constraints and the external position of the
experimenter, by the end of the experimental phase, safety had not
completely become the supervisors' responsibility. However, during the
presentation of final results and in the follow-up sessions, several
Changes were observed In the safety co^ittee members which showed a shift
rn responsibilities from the committee to the "line" employees. For
one, the production manager, who was not initially Involved with safety-
related problems, was the first to volunteer to follow through the
program. He also expressed real concern for its continuation, becoming
tively involved in it. Also when one member of the committee suggested
a return to monthly inspections, the Personnel Manager and some super-
visors clearly rejected this in favor of weekly inspections. The main
point is that the safety program became a "line" responsibility and
ceased to be looked at as a "staff" function. However, more organization-
al follow-up would have been necessary to definitely implement safety
as part of the supervisors’ Job description.
Critique of design and measurement system
Although the multiple baseline design served the purpose of per-
mitting a functional analysis of the intervention without requiring a
reversal period, the design itself seemed to occasion some problems.
When treatment was introduced to Group I the other groups remained
under baseline conditions, "blind" as to treatment procedures. Under
those conditions the supervisors in Group I seemed to develop a very
self-serving concern about their department’s safety. Hazards in their
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department were occasionally corrected at the expense of other depart-
ments. For example, obstructions were moved from one department to
another. Concern about safety became limited to one's department,
rather than for the company as a whole. Similar reactions developed
when treatment was implemented with Group II. By the time Group 111 was
included in treatment, a certain interdepartmental competitiveness seemed
to have developed over safety concerns. This competition seemed to pro-
mote a lack of cooperation. Perhaps thrs problem could have been
obviated if the whole company had been considered as a single group and
treatment implemented in all departments simultaneously. The other
plants belonging to the organization could have been used for replication
purposes. In cases where there is only one setting, if departments are
completely separated, the problem might not arise. Otherwise, perhaps
replication could be conducted across two different companies.
To control indirect, unplanned sources of variability such as
changes of supervisors, recruitment of new employees, arrival of new
material, production requirements, inventories, etc., perhaps longer
phases would have been advisable. However, in applied settings, as
Us I an (1977) points out, one cannot wait forever until all those factors
are eliminated. This problem might be minimized by replication across
settings in different locations. Separate sites would also minimize
generalization across settings. Although the need to keep other super-
visors uninformed as to the exact nature of treatment was stressed in
each case, the reactions of the supervisors under baseline conditions
suggested that they may have become aware of the types of hazards being
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recorded (Figure 4 illustrates a decrease in hazards during baseline of
Sroup III simultaneously with the introduction of treatment In Group II).
However this change could also be due to the meeting held between
managers and supervisors mentioned above.
With respect to the measurement, it was clear in some cases that
using frequency as the main dependent variable obscured the effects of
treatment. In certain departments, mainly departments 2, 4 and 6, some
major changes implemented following feedback are not reflected in the
data. For example, if a very heavy piece of equipment which had been
obstructing an aisle was removed, (requiring a major effort from several
people and the location of an appropriate place to deposit it) and a
small box was put in its place, the recorded frequency would not have
varied. Yet feedback had been effective; the hazard was removed and
the danger was now minor. This effect, however, would not be reflected
in the results. Perhaps in future work, a weighting system could be
developed whereby hazards are assigned different points according to
seriousness or potential to cause an accident or injury and perhaps to
location.
The biweekly feedback was probably more effective than the monthly
Inspections previously performed by the safety committee. In analyzing
the committee's files, before starting the behavioral intervention, one
found that the same hazards were reported several times. Some of these
were still present when the behavioral program was started. Although
such hazards were not immediately modified, by the third or fourth time
feedback was given, change had been implemented. The repetitiveness of
the feedback may have accounted for its effectiveness. After experimental
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ervention, weekly feedback was programmed with the
Follow-ap data would be necessary to see if the shift
hazard frequency or not. Yet it could be anticipated
be more effective than monthly feedback.
safety committee,
in schedule affected
that week I y w i I I
Cost benefit analysis of feedback-package system
Industrial management is primarily concerned with production.
Thus, for any adjunct program to be accepted, it has to either enhance
production or at least not affect it adversely. Our specific safety
program might not have increased production directly (and that was not one
of its goals), but indirectly it certainly favored production by reducing
hazardous conditions. The primary value of the program was its simplicity
and the ease with which it could be incorporated in the supervisor's
rout i ne.
Once hazards were identified and defined, which is probably the
major effort involved in the program, any person can carry out the inspec-
tions using a simple form with a list of hazards and a map. Not more
than 10 to 15 minutes a day are required to inspect the whole area, and
it need not be inspected dal ly. One or two departments can receive the
feedback at a time, each day, and the very same observation forms can
also be used as feedback forms. No special apparatus or expertise are
required. The cost benefit is quite evidently a very favorable one.
Indirect benefits . The implementation of the feedback system brought
about several indirect benefits that deserve separate mention. Although
the company had an ongoing safety committee and major hazards had been
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corrected long before the experimental intervention, the new safety
program did appear to promote a safety awareness among the employees that
had not been previously observed. Both managers and workers seemed to
become increasingly conscious of safety hazards, realizing that they
could correct the hazards. They appeared to become more aware of their
safety responsibilities. At the management level, this was observed in
the increase of meetings dealing with safety-related issues and the
active involvement of the production manager after the program was com-
pleted, At the worker level it was evident in their constant efforts to
correct hazardous conditions and their questions about safety standards
posed to the experimenter. Safety issues seemed to have acquired an
important status and as mentioned previously, safety became a line
function
.
In departments two, four and five, several ’’housec I ean i ng" effects
were evident following the introduction of treatment. To be able to
correct obstructions of working material, several ’’untouched" areas were
Inspected and cleaned. Boxes of irregularly finished products were
found. These were corrected and packed for shipment. Raw materials were
put back in circulation; unused equipment was used or stored properly;
machines that needed replacement or were to be removed were finally
taken care of. Changes in machine layout that had long been planned
were finally implemented. The awareness of space value increased as a
consequence of the safety program.
Since in order to eliminate certain hazards the supervisors needed
the cooperation of other personnel, long lasting Interaction problems
were solved. The reduction of hazards became important enough for the
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supervisors to work out communication problems which had existed for a
long time. In department 2 for example, to replace machine guards, get
rid of unused equipment and clear aisles of obstructing material, the
assistance of set-up personnel had to be solicited. Due to previous
difficulties with set-up chief, the supervisor had decided to ignore
these hazards; but when the supervisor realized their correction was her
responsibility and that she was being held accountable for this, she
negotiated solutions with the set-up people. Feedback to those personnel
also increased their cooperation. Similar effects were observed in
departments 5 and 6.
Suggestions for future research
Several changes for improving the present program have already
been suggested:
1. That the program be implemented simultaneously throughout a
whole organization, using other organizations or settings for
replication purposes in order to avoid the negative effects
of competition that were pointed out previously.
2. Maintain phases for longer periods of time.
3. Modify the measurement system, since there are important
effects of the program which are not reflected in the frequency
data. A weighted frequency could provide a more valid reflec-
tion of change.
Other topics for future research that evolved from the present
study might include:
I. Incorporating safety responsibilities within supervisors' job
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descriptions and setting up a reinforcement program through
management for meeting this responsibility.
2. Adding hazardous behaviors to the list of hazardous conditions
in the safety program and appointing the supervisor the
observer and reinforcement agent and reinforcing accomplish-
ment of this task. Komaki et al.'s (1977) study suggests
supervisors can be effective agents of change in a safety
program.
3. Designing a safety program that requires regular reevaluation
and redefinition of hazard check list. Hazards change and
when some are corrected, others may arise, which might not
have been included originally. (The very process of conceptu-
alization of hazards may Itself promote awareness).
4. Incorporating the workers in the safety program by posting
results of feedback system as suggested in other studies
(Feeney, 1972; Komaki etal., 1977).
The relation between this study and Su I zer-Azarof f ' s (1978)
research In a university sciences laboratory deserves special comment in
terms of generalization issues and suggestions for future research. A
critical concern in behavioral research is that the general izabi I ity of
the results may be limited. The effectiveness of a particular treatment
could for example, be due to the specific conditions of the setting, or
to the characteristics of the experimenter. Systematic replicafion thus
becomes very valuable in these cases. As SIdman (I960) pointed out
"every successful systematic replication demonstrates that the finding
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in question can be observed under conditions different from those pre-
vailing in the original experiment" (p. IM). This study constituted
such a systematic replication, as conditions were not identical to
Sulzer-Azaroff’s. Under different conditions it did replicate the use
of a simple feedback-suggestion system and was also successful in reduc-
ing hazardous conditions. Even though the setting and the people Involved
were different, treatment produced the same results, thereby supporting
the conclusion that the feedback system has powerful controlling proper-
ties. One can therefore have Increased confidence that this system will
be effective again when used in other settings. Additional systematic
replications would further increase the external validity of the findings.
In terms of future research the systematic replication did demon-
strate the power of the feedback despite variations in procedure. How-
ever, there are aspects of the various conditions that prevailed In the
two studies that deserve further attention. The frequency of feedback
could affect the outcome In further replications. In Su I zer-Azarof f '
s
study, laboratory heads received feedback approximately once every three
to four weeks. In the present study, feedback was delivered twice a week.
In both cases, hazards decreased. At this point one might search for
optimal frequency of feedback conditions, i.e., what frequency of feed-
back is associated with more rapid and/or enduring results.
A similar question can be raised about the frequency of data
collection and the timing of inspections. In the present case, data were
recorded daily and the subjects usually saw the observer. In the univer-
sity case, data were collected in each laboratory once every three to
four weeks and the lab heads rarely saw the observer. These variables
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could be partialed out In future research to probe for their differential
effects. The extent to which observers might function as discriminative
stimuli for correcting hazardous conditions and The frequency of data
collection may systematically affect change and should be studied.
Neither of the studies partialed out the mediator of feedback,
"who" delivered the suggestions, nor the inclusion of reinforcing com-
ments. These aspects also varied between the two studies. In the
present study, the production and personnel managers were identified as
the authors of the feedback suggestions, whereas in the other study the
safety committee communicated the suggestions. Long term evaluations of
this factor might determine how the role of the mediator might produce
differential effects.
Encouraging and congratulatory comments regularly were used in
this study but only irregularly in the Su I zer-Azarof f study. Since both
showed Improvement, one might be led to the conclusion that such comments
might not add anything substantial to the results. Previous research in
industry (Feeney, 1972) has also shown that feedback alone can be
extremely effective. However, it is not l^nown whether the addition of
approving feedback would have promoted further improvement in the Sulzer-
Azaroff (1978) study, or if its omission in the present study may have
reduced the effectiveness of the intervention. Additionally, approval
could have positive collateral effects, towards the safety program and
its staff; future research should consider measuring such side effects.
Consequently, what seems clear for future research is the need to evaluate
each component of the program separately to determine the relative effec-
tiveness of each. However, considering the demands of applied settings
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this may not always be feasible. The major question at this time is
how to achieve long term effectiveness of the present system.
In summary, this study contributed both to the field of industrial
safety and to the use of behavior modification principles for management
purposes. As mentioned previously there is a lack of reports on the
measurement of the effectiveness of safety programs. This project
specifically implemented a safety program and measured its impact on the
frequency of hazards. On the other hand, this study demonstrated once
more that a learning theory approach is useful in analyzing management-
related problems because it focuses its attention on some critical vari-
ables which make it effective. These variables are among others the
selection of dependent and reliable variables (consequences of overt
behavior) and the reinforcement contingencies to implement the treatment
effectively. The choice of these critical variables for safety-related
purposes was effective and thus permits one to think that it would also
be successful in other management-related problems. This is then, one
further step for building what can be called organizational behavior
management. That is, a management field that uses behavior modification
principles to fulfill its goals.
88
REFERENCES
Accldent^Facts^ 1977 Edition
. National Safety Councl
I , Chicago: Author,
^cident Prevention Manual
.
(6th ed.) National Safety Council, Chicago:
ACDC reaches new levels In productivity. Performance Imorovement. Derom-
ber, 1975, J_ (I), |-8.
^
All about OSHA. Programs and Policy Series
. Department of Labor,
Washington, D. C.: Author, 1976.
Altman, J. W. Behavior and Accidents. Journal of Safety Research 1970
2 (3), 107-122. ^
'
At Emergy Air Fre|ght: Positive reinforcement boosts performance. Organ-
Izatlonal Dynamics
,
Winter, 1973, J_ (3), 41-50.
Ayllon, T., & Azrin, N. H. The token economy: A motivational system for
therapy and rehabilitation. New York: App I eton-Century
,
1968.
Azrin, N. H., Flores, T., & Kaplan, S. J. Job-finding club: a group-
assisted program for obtaining employment. Behavior Research and
Therapy
,
1975, \^, 17-27.
Baer, D. M., Wolf, M. M., & RIsley, T. R. Some current dimensions of
applied behavior analysis. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis,
1968, j_, 91-97.
Barbee, J. R., & Kell, E. C. Experimental techniques of job interview
training for the disadvantaged: videotape feedback, behavior
modification and microcounseling. Journal of Applied Psychology,
1973, ^ 209-213.
Barlow, D. H., Leltengerg, H., & Agras, W. S. Experimental control of
sexual deviation through manipulation of the noxious scene In
covert sensitization. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 1969, 10,
41 I-4I5.
Barry, P. Z. Individual versus community orientation in the prevention
of injuries. Preventive Medicine , 1975, 4_, 47-56.
Barry, T., Crisera, R. A., & Fidel 1, S. Behavioral Analysis of workers
and job hazards In the roofing industry. Cincinnati: HEW, June,
mr.
^
Becker, W. C. Parents are teachers:
^
child management program . Cham-
paign, III.: Research Press, 1971.
89
Beckhard, R.
Mass.
;
Organization development.
Addison-wesley, 1969.
^^*~9tegies and niodels. Read i ng.
Belbin, Eunice. The effects of propaganda on recall
behavior. The British Journal of Psychology
.
recognition and
1956, XLVI
I ,
259-
Bird, F. E. & Germain, G. L. Damage control: a new horizon
prevention and cost improvement
. New York: ^erican
Association, 1966.
in accident
Management
Blake, R. P. Industrial safety
Hall, I94T:
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice
Blumenthal, M. An alternative approach to measurement of industrial
safety performance based on a structural conception of accident
causation. Journal of Safety Research
. 1970, 2 (3), 123-151.
Brown, P. L. & Presbie, R. J. Behavior modification in industry and
government. New Paltz, New York: Behavior Improvement Associates,
Bushell,D. Classroom behavior: a little book for teachers
. Englewood
Cl iffs. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1973.
Clark, R* First-aid systems - which one is right for you? Environmen-
ta I Control and Safety Management
,
March 1971.
Clark, F. W., Evans, D. R. & Hamorlynck, L. A. (eds.). Implementing Behav-
ioral programs for school and clin ics. Champaign, 111.: Research
Press, 1972.
Cohen, A., Smith, M., & Cohen, H. M. Safety program in high versus low
accident rate companies - an Interim report. Cincinnati: HEW.
NIOSH, June 1975.
~
Crawford, P. L. Hazard exposure to differentiation necessary for the
Identification of the accident-prone employee. Journal of Applied
Psychology
,
I960, 44, 192-194.
Dalziel, C. F. You can de-shock electricity. Environmental Control
Management
,
August 1969, 46-50.
Daniels, L. K. (Ed.). The management of childhood behavior problems in
school and at home . Springfield, Ml.: Charles C. Thomas, 1974.
Davids, A., & Mahoney, J. T. Personality dynamics and accident proneness
in an industrial setting. Journal of Applied Psychology, 1975, 41
(5), 303.
90
Drucker P. I^naglng for results, economic tasks and r isk-t^kinndecisions. New York: Harper & Row, 1 965. ^
Reported significant observation. RSO Studies. Idaho
rails, Idaho: Aerojet Nuclear Co., March 1977,' 77, 3.
Ellis, L. Review of research efforts to promote occupational safety.Journal o f Safety Research
. December 1975, 7 (40), 180-189.
Emmert, G. D Measuring the impact of group performance feedback versusindividual performance feedback in an industrial setting. Journal
of Organ izational Behavior Management
. Winter, 1978, I (2)
,
'
I !54- 1 4 1
.
Errors get whammy. Performance Improvement
. 1976, I (4), 8.
Evans, P. E. Safety management: band-aids or big business? Environmen-
ta I Control Management
, August 1969.
Everett, P. B., Hayward, S. C., & Meyers, A. W. The effects of a token
reinforcement procedure on bus ridership. Journal of Applied
Behavior Analysis
. 1974, 7, 1-9.
^
Farmer, E., & Chambers, E. G. A study of accident proneness among motor
drivers
. London: Industrial Health Research Board Report, 1939.
Feeney, E. J. Performance audit, feedback and positive reinforcement.
Training and Development Journa l, November 1972, 26, (II), 8-13.
Firenze, R. J. Brainstorm your way to a new safety approach. Environ-
menta I Control Management
,
November 1969.
Foster, C. Developing self-control. Kalamazoo, Mich.: Behaviordel ia.
1974.
Fox, R. M., & Azrin, N. H. Toilet training the retarded: A rapid program
for day and nighttime i ndependent toi let i ng . Champaign, 111.:
Research Press, 1973.
Goldstein, A. P., & Sorcher, M. Changing supervisor behavior . New York:
Pergamon Press, 1974.
Goode, Q. W. Motivating human behavior for top safety performance . Las
Vegas, Nev. : Electrical Engineering Co., 1975.
Greene, E. S. Machine guarding: how far do we go? Environmental Control
Management
,
December 1969, 55-58.
Greenwood, M. & Woods, H. M. The incidence of industrial accidents upon
individuals with special reference to multiple accidents . London:
Industrial Health Research Board Report, 1919.
91
"''"°"’
Blha^ofTtera;v = '--9® industrial fi™.
"io^: t97S!"^^,, 5
-“= '" perspective. Occupational Psycho-
Hammer W. Handbook of system an d product safety. Englewood Cl if fsNew Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1972.
>^ngiewo a li tt .
Harper D G.
& ^Iton G. Study of the effectiveness of the NationalBoard s safety pro^aga^. London; National Coal Board,
—
Harris, F. J. A comparison of the
and non-accident industrial
Methods in Accident control
279-280.
personality characteristics of accident
populations. In Johnson, Personnel
The American Psychologist
.
1949 (4),
Heinrich, H. W. Industrial accident prevention
New York: McGraw Hill, 1941.
a scientific approarh
Herman
B., Montes, F. & Hopkings,
B. L. Effects of bonuses for punctuality on the tardiness of
industrial workers. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, 1973, 6
,
Hersen, M., & Barlow, D. H. Single case experimenta l designs. New York:
Pergamon Press, 1976.
“
Hersey, R. B. Emotional factors in accidents. Personnel
,
May 1936, 15,
Jacobs, H. H. Towards more effective safety measurement systems. Journal
of Safety Research
, 1970, 2 (3), 160-175.
Jones, R. G. Guarding man at his machine. Environmental Control and
Safety Management
,
February 1971.
^
Jones, R. J., & Azrin, N. H. An experimental application of a social
reinforcement approach to the problem of job-finding. Journal of
Applied Behavior Analysis
,
1973, 345-354.
Kazdin, A. E. Behavior modification in applied settings . Homewood, III.:
Dorsey Press, 1975.
Keefer, W. D. Accident Costs. In R. P. Blake (Ed.), Industrial Safety .
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1943.
92
Kerr, W. Complementary theories of
Psychology
. 1957, 45, 309.
safety psychology. Journal of Social
nberg, R., Phi I I ips, T., & Proctor, W., A behavioral
peaking in residential electrical
-energy consumers
App I led Behav I or Ana I ys I
s
. 1976, 9, 13-18.
analysis of
Journal of
Komakr, J., Barwick, K. D., & Scott, L. R. Improving
using the behavior analysis approach. In M. R,
Behaviorism in the post-industrial revolution:
IS. Symposium presented at the meeting of the
cal Association, San Francisco, August, 1977.
occupational safety
Blood (Chair)
Where the action
American Psycho log I
-
Krasner L. Behavior therapy. Annual Review of Psychology
. 1971, 22, 483-
Lamal, P. A. & Bonfleld, A. The effect of sel f-monitoring on job tardi-
ness and percentage of time spent working. Journal of Organ I za-
tional Behavior Management
. Winter 1978, I, (2), 142-149!
Laner, S. & Sell, R. G. An experiment on the effect of specially design
ed safety posters. Occupational Psychology. July I960. 34 (3)
153-169. ~ ' — '
Lazarus, A. A. & Davison, G. C. Clinical innovation in research and
practice. |n A. E. Bergin & S. L. Garfield (Eds.), Handbook of
psychotherapy and behavior change: an empirical analysis. New
York: Wiley, 1971, 196-213.
Lieberman, R. P., King, L. W., DeRIsi, W. J., & McCann, M. Personal
effectiveness: guiding people to assert themselves and improve
thei r social ski 1 Is. Champaign, 111.: Research Press, 1975.
Luthans, R., & Kreitner, R. Organizational behavior modification
. Glen-
view, III.: Scott, Foreman & Co., 1 975.
McCarthy, M. Decreasing the incidence of high bobbins in a textile
spinning department through a group feedback procedure. Journal
of Organizational Behavior Management. Winter 1978, I (2Ti 1 50-
154.
McGregor, D. The human side of enterprise . New York: McGraw Hill, 1968.
McKelvey, R. K.
,
Engen, T., & Peck, H. B. Performance efficiency and
injury avoidance as a function of positive and negative incentives.
Journal of Safety Research
,
June 1973, 90-96.
McLean, A. Versatile videotape recorder. A handy safety training tool.
National Safety News, January 1977, 115 (I), 46-47.
93
-^'°vee. Pe.sonne,
.
”^''^°'‘on c;.=i‘’h*'
°- °* 9''°'^P response-cost proceduresash shortages in a small business. Journal of ADp|?^rBehavior Analysis
. 1976
,
9
,
25-30 .
''PP'led
Mertens de WHmar, C. Studies in the influence of group cohesion and
internal systems of ccmmunications on accident
stell wo^kl *'°pLls°“''r
factors and safety In mines and
—ee r s. Pari ; Communaute turopeene et d’Acier, I $6?.
lIi.!:, °!
^^9^;9ment: Implications for ordanirntlnneiDehavior a nd development
. New York: McGraw-Hill, T975.
^ Reinforcing self-help group activities
of welfare recipients. Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis.
19/0, £, 57-64.
Mitchell, B. The Australian story. Performance Improvement. Anri i lotfi
_[_
( 6 )
,
1 -4 . '
Neisworth, J. T. & Smith, R. M. Modifying retarded behavior. Boston-
Houghton Miff I in, 1973.
Newbold, E. M. A contribution to the study of the human factor in the
causati on of accidents
. London: Industrial Health and Research
Board Report, 1926.
Nertney, R.^J. Training as related to behavioral change. Energy Research
and Development Administration
,
January 1976, 77, 4.
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Occupational Expo-
sure to Inorganic Arsenic. New criteria, U. S. Department of HEW,
Public Health Service Center for Disease Control, Washington, D.
C.: Author, 1975.
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, Occupational Expo-
sure to Inorganic Nickel. U. S. Department of HEW, Public Health
and Service Center for Disease Control, Washington, D. C. Author,
1977.
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. Publications
Catalog. U. S. Department of HEW, Public Health Service Center for
Disease Control. Washington, D. C.: February 1978.
Nord, W. Improving attendance through rewards. Personnel Administration
,
November-December 1970, 33, 37-41.
94
.
I f ^
I am \j\Wnal of Organizationa l Behavior Manag^mpn-h
on the 3bsenteeis of
Pfister, R. G._ Components of an effective exterior safety program
Professional Safety
. November 1975, 20, 45-48.
Pierce, C. H. Accident and injury control among institutionalized
retarded adults: Methodological issues. Paper presented at the
Symposium "Health and the Operant Model." Third annual meeting
of the Midwestern Association of behavior analysis, Chicago: May
Pierce, C. H. Environmental change for injury prevention among the
institutionalized retarded. Paper submitted to the American
Psychological Association at the 86th annual meeting, Toronto.
August 1978.
Pomerleau, 0., Bass, F., & Crown, V. Role of behavior modification in
preventive medicine. New England Journal of Medicine, June 12,
1975, ^ (24), 1277-1282:
~~
Pope, W. C. Innovations in safety management. Environmental Control
Management
,
July 1969.
Price, D. Toward an integrated safety training program. Professional
Safety
,
November 1976, ^ (II), 42-45.
Principles and Practices of Occupational Safety and Health: A programmed
i nstruct ton course. Student Manual. Booklet 5. U.S. Department
of Labor, OSHA. VTashington, D. C. Author, 1976.
Quilitch, H. R. A comparison of three staff -management procedures.
Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis
,
1975, 59-66,
Rettew, V. E. Jr., Emergency showers - who needs them? Env i ronmenta
I
Control and Safety Management
,
January 1971, 24-2E~.
95
The effects of feedback and
ime in materials transportation.
Management
. 1978,
_[ (2), I 10-117.
Journa
I
Safety and the Bottom Line. Performance Improvement
. August 1977, 2 (8),
Santamaria M._C A Marxist analysis of the use of behavior mod i f ir.at innjn the i ndustrial and business settings
. Paper presented to meet
Comprehenstves Examination Requirements, University of Massachusetts,
Amherst, 1977.
Sasser, ^J.R. Systems safety for unsystematic people. Environmental
control Management
.
February 1970, 57-59.
Smiley, J. A. A clinical study of a group of accident prone workers.
British Journal of Industrial Medicine
. 1955, 12 (4), 263.
Smith, L. A. Human factors in safety engineering. Environmental Control
and Safety Management
.
April 1970.
Souweine, J. Maintaining increased teacher-praise through principal
attention. (Doctoral dissertation. University of Massachusetts,
1977). Dissertation Abstracts International, 1977.
Sterner, F. M. Safety motivation - how is it done? Environmental Control
and Safety Management
,
February 1969, 15-18.
Stack, H. J., & Elbow, J. D. Education for safe living
. Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1957.
Strasser, M. K.
,
Aaron, J. E., Boh, R. 0., & Eales, J. R. Fundamentals of
Safety Education . New York: MacMillan Co., 1964.
Su I zer-Azarof f , B., & Mayer, R. G. Applying behavior analysis procedures
with children and youth . New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1977.
Su 1 zer-Azarof f, B. Behavioral ecology and accident prevention . Paper
presented at the Midwestern Association of Behavior Therapy, Chicago,
May, 1978.
Tarrants, W. E. A definition of the safety measurement problem. Journa
!
of Safety Research, 1970, 2, \ 106-108.
96
Tharp, R. & Wetzel, R.
ment. New York
Behavior modification in the natural
Academic Press, 1972. ~
env I ron-
Thoresen, C.
Holt,
E., & Mahoney, M. J. Behavioral self-control
Rinehart & Winston, I97T1; ’
New York:
Tiffin, J. & McCormick, E. J.
Allen & Unwin, 1962.
Industrial Psychology
. London: George,
Tydlaska, M. Is there a common denominator for accident prone? Safety
Maintenance and Production
. 1952, pp. 25-39.
^
Ullman, L. P. & Krasner, L. A psychological approach to abnormal behavior.
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Ha I 1 , 1975 .
Us I an, S. $. Scientific report for the contract entitled Research on
Accident Reduction by reinforcement of safe behavior. Paper sub-
mitted to Health Education and Welfare, National Institute for
Occupational Safety and Health. Washington, D. C.: 1977.
Van Zelst, R. H. The effect of age and experience upon accident rate.
Journal of Applied Psychology
. 1954, 3 1 3-3 1 7.
Walker, H. M. Token reinforcement techniques: Classroom applications for
the hard-to-teach child . Eugene, Oregon: E-B Press, 1974.
Whitlock, J
. B. & Crannel
I ,
C. W. An analysis of certain factors in
serious accidents in a large steel works. Journal of Applied
Psychology
, 1949, ^ (5), p. 494.
Wigg lesworth, E. C. A teaching model of injury and a guide for selecting
countermeasures. Occupational Psychology
, 1972, 46, 69-78.
Winett, R. A., & Nietzel, M. T. Behavioral ecology. American Journal of
Community Psychology
,
1975, 123-133.
.
Zifferblatt, S. M. Improving study and homework behaviors . Champaign,
Illinois: Research Press, 1973,
97
APPENDIX A:
Consent Form
As was announced a couple of weeks ago,
with the University of Massachusetts in a research
Safety.
is cooperating
project on Industrial
You probably have been the representatives from U. Mass, that
have been walking around the plant observing our safety program and
rts operation. They will be recording the number, type, and place of
hazards. The information collected will be shared with all the employees
and the whole analysis will be made available to be used in improving
the safety conditions at work.
it is our sincere belief that studies such as these are beneficial
to continue improving the safety conditions of our company. Consequently,
your participation is very much appreciated. Should you wish, you may
elect not to participate and are free to withdraw your participation.
I have read the above and consent to participate. I understand that
hazards will be recorded, but this in no way will affect my situation in
the company.
Signature
Print your name
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APPENDIX B:
Sample of Department Observation Form
DEPARTMENT
DATE;
HAZARD;
OBSERVER:
I. Obstruction of walking-working surfaces by;
A. Working material
B. Cleaning equipment
’
C. Waste
D. Skids & Pa I I ets
^
^ ~
E. Unused equipment
^11. Exit, ladder or sprinkler obstructed
'
III. Hazardous materials:
A. Flammable liquids not identified or open
B. Flammable materials closet door open
C. Rags in improper can
IV. Materials storage:
A.
B.
Leaning stack
l-oot obstacles or materials jetting into
aisles or wa 1 kways
macn 1 ne guard i ng:
A. Guard removed
B. Guard misplaced
El ectrical hazards:
A. Knock-out off
B. Sockets uncovered
C. Sockets damaged
D. Sockets overworked
E. Other
INDIVIDUAL DEPARTMENT MAP
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APPENDIX D:
Samples of Feedback-Suggestion Form
TO: Department 4 Supervisor
From: Production Manager & Personnel Manage
Subject: SAFETY
Date: June 16, 1978
The staff and management of want to stress the
importance of your active participation in maintaining safety standards.
We appreciate every- effort you make for this.
Eleven hazards were recorded in yesterday's inspection, one more
than in last Monday's inspection.
Please read the suggestions in the form attached and let us know
how we can help you reduce the hazards.
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TO: Department 2 Supervisor
From
:
Production Manager & Personnel Manag
Subject: SAFETY
Date: June 20, 1978
We were extremely pleased to find no hazards within
area! Congratulations! Only one obstruction was found in
aisle that can easily be put under the storage racks, away
aisle.
your working
the back
from the
We must stress once again our appreciation for your continued
efforts to maintain high safety standards. According to yesterday’s
inspection, you reached the lowest level up until now; your previous
level was three hazards. Do keep it up!
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TO: Department 5 Supervisor
From: Production Manager & Personnel Manager
Subject: SAFETY
Date: June 30, 1978
The staff and management of must congratulate you
once again for maintaining high safety standards in your department!
Only one obstruction was recorded in yesterday's inspection, one more
than in last Monday's inspection. We realize it is difficult to keep a
"perfect place," but we must recognize that your area looks pretty
clear and safe almost always. Do keep it up and let us know whenever
you encounter any problems in maintaining safety conditions at top
I eve I
.
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TO: Department
1 Supervisor
From: Production Manager & Personnel Manager
Subject
:
SAFETY
Date: June 30, 1978
The staff and management of appreciate your efforts
to maintain good safety standards in your department. Although in yes-
terday's inspection hazards were up again to 14, in Wednesday's inspec-
tion they had been considerably reduced, and changes towards improving
safety conditions were evident. We hope you can keep this up!
In the form attached you can identify the hazards recorded
yesterday. Some of the obstructions are difficult to modify, for
example, the drying racks occupy a lot of space. However, other hazards
can be easily changed by simply placing them within the working area,
for example the tables, can and waste basket marked with an *. Also,
the exit can be cleared very easily by removing the black dumpster from
the exit area and placing it two feet away.
We hope you can implement some of these suggestions to reduce the
amount of hazards in your area. Do let us know how you can be helped
further to continue reducing hazards.
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TO: Chief Engineer, Machine Shop
From
:
Production Manager & Personnel Manager
Date: July 14, 1978
Subject: SAFETY
As you know, we have been carrying out dally safety inspections
of every department in the company and giving bi-weekly feedback on the
type and number of hazards to the supervisors.
From the beginning of this project, it was decided with the
Safety Committee’s advice, that the Machine Shop would not be included
in the safety program since it was difficult to identify certain hazards
for the following reasons:
- The machine shop has no drawn walkways
- It is constantly changing, and
- The personnel were considered very "safety" aware.
However, in the observations of the Receiving Department, we have found
several hazards that cannot be corrected by this department, but rather
require your intervention.
On the form attached you can identify the hazards recorded in
yesterday’s inspection. Most of these are obstructions of a major Exit
walkway. Some equipment with sharp edges has been left at the very
entrance from the Shipping Department; the acetylene tanks and hose are
obstructing the aisle; the ladder area, although tidier than before, is
still not completely clear. Most of these hazards can be easily correct-
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ed. Perhaps the equipment can be put at the left hand side of the
entrance where there is space available.
would also like to ask your cooperation in correcting hazards
in other departments. For example, in the Polaroid Department a machine
guard has been removed; in the Screening Department one socket has a
knock out off and another is overcharged.
We certainly appreciate any effort you make to help maintain
safety standards in your area and in other departments of the company.
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APPENDIX E:
Safety Program General Announcement
NOTICE
' All emp I oyees
Personnel Manager
SUBJ ECT
: Safety
«tll be cooperating with the University of Massachusetts
in a research project covering Industrial Safety.
During the coming weeks, representatives will be visiting our
company to obtain information on our safety program and to observe the
overall operation of it.
This research project should prove mutually beneficial to the
University and
. While the survey representatives obtain the
information needed for their project, we will be furnished the results of
their observations so that we may continue to improve the overall safety
operations of our company.
I request that each individual offer their ful
I
cooperation to
this project.
Thank you


